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DIVORCE EQUALITY
Allison Anna Tait*
Abstract: The battle for marriage equality has been spectacularly successful, producing
great optimism about the transformation of marriage. The struggle to revolutionize the
institution of marriage is, however, far from over. Next is the battle for divorce equality.
With the initial wave of same-sex divorces starting to appear on court dockets, this Article
addresses the distinctive property division problems that have begun to arise with same-sex
divorce and that threaten, in the absence of rule reform, to both amplify and reinscribe
problems with the conventional marital framework. Courts have failed to realize the
cornerstone concept of equitable distribution-marriage as an economic partnership-in the
context of different-sex marriage. Because same-sex divorce highlights this failing, this
Article uses same-sex divorce as a lens through which to reexamine the untapped potential of
equitable distribution statutes.
Two questions drive the analysis. One question is how to decide which assets count as
marital property and how to value one spouse's contributions to the other spouse's career
success. I propose that courts characterize enhanced earning capacity as marital property and
count indirect spousal contributions toward the growth in value of business assets. Without
these changes, courts fail to capture the nature of marital partnership and properly
compensate contributions made by non-earning spouses. Another question, made salient by
same-sex "hybrid" cases in which the spouses have been long-term cohabiting partners but
short-term marital partners, is how to determine when an economic partnership begins. I
propose that courts use the category of "pre-marital" property in order to count assets and
income acquired outside of the marriage itself.
Addressing these questions is critical to the reformation of marriage because property
rules impact how spouses bargain with one another, how diverse roles get valued in marital
bargains, and how we assign and perform gender within marriage. Moreover, proper
compensation for spousal contributions rewards individuals for making choices that benefit
the couple rather than the individual, which is normatively positive behavior. These
proposals for rule reform provide guidance for courts, both those encountering an increasing
number of same-sex divorces as well those deliberating over how best to assess spousal
contributions in different-sex marriages. Furthermore, the proposals in this Article provide a
blueprint for advocates who seek to continue the work of marriage equality in the hopes of
further unwinding the power of gender within marriage.
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INTRODUCTION
First comes marriage; then comes divorce. Different-sex couples have
experienced this truism for centuries. Now, following close on the
successes of the marriage equality movement, the first wave of same-sex
couples is seeking to get divorced.1 The current revolutionary moment in
* Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. For comments and conversation, my
thanks go to Erez Aloni, Richard Brooks, Jessica Clarke, Hanoch Dagan, Deborah Dinner, Elizabeth
Emens, Martha Ertman, Katherine Franke, Debra Guston, Meredith Harbach, Claudia Haupt,
Michael Heller, Patricia Hennessey, Suzanne Kahn, Alicia Kelly, Suzanne Kim, Serena Mayeri,
Michael McHugh, Rachel Rebouche, Cathy Sakimura, Carol Sanger, Elizabeth Scott, Julie Shapiro,
Sarah Swan, Kendall Thomas, and Joan Williams. My thanks go as well to the editorial staff of this
journal whose work and input were invaluable. Finally, I benefitted greatly from the input of the
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the progress of marriage law promises to shift conventional gendered
understandings of the institution. Yet, in order to make good on this
promise, it is necessary to reexamine the rules governing marital
property and equitable distribution. Much of the work that gender
performs in a marriage is not revealed until the moment of divorce,
when couples and courts are asked to value the contributions of
individual spouses to the marriage. 2 If same-sex marriage is to transform
the institution of marriage,3 law must reflect equality not only at entry
participants in the New York area family law workshop, participants in the 2015 LSA panel "New
Forms of Intimate Ordering," participants in the 2015 Family Law Scholars and Teachers
Conference, participants in the 2015 Association of American Law Schools mid-year meeting panel
on "The Impact of Same-Sex Marriage," and members of the Associates and Fellows workshop at
Columbia Law School.
1. See, e.g., Joe Coscarelli, Gay-Marriage Pioneers Recall 'Huge Journey,' NYMAG.COM (June
26, 2013, 11:37 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/06/ulie-hillary-goodridge-on-gay-
marriage-supreme-court.html ("Julie and Hillary Goodridge are no longer married, but the important
thing is that they were .... Part of the importance of marriage includes divorce and the laws that
then govern a breakup." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Julie and Hillary Goodridge were the
plaintiffs in the landmark case Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003) (holding limitation of civil marriage to male-female unions under Massachusetts marriage
licensing statutes unconstitutional under Massachusetts constitution). See also Tracy Connor,
Lesbian Couple Who Got Hitched Shortly After Gay Marriage Became Legal in New York State Set
to Become One of First Gay Divorces, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 25, 2012, 11:44 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/gay-divorces-finalized-state-article-1. 1 02288 ("It was
inevitable. The legalization of gay marriage in New York is yielding the first wave of gay
divorces."); Clyde Haberman, After Same-Sex Marriage, Same-Sex Divorce, N.Y. TIMES CITY
ROOM (June 27, 2011, 8:34 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/after-same-sex-
marriage-same-sex-divorce/ (noting possible "complications" attending impending wave of same-
sex divorces).
2. See FREDERICK HERTZ & EMILY DOSKOW, MAKING IT LEGAL: A GUIDE TO SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE, DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS & CIVIL UNIONS 61 (2014) ("The legal implications of
marriage take on their real meaning when couples separate.").
3. Some commentators and scholars argue that same-sex marriage will transform marriage by
making it a more gender-equitable institution. See, e.g., Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People
Should Seek the Right to Marry, in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE 13, 14-16 (Suzanne Sherman ed.,
1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1487-88
(1993); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY:
REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 9, 18-19 (1991). Others are more skeptical and have argued
that "[m]arriage runs counter to two of the primary goals of the lesbian and gay movement: the
affirmation of gay identity and culture; and the validation of many forms of relationships." Paula L.
Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN Q.
(1989), reprinted in WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN, CASES ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (West.
Pub. Co. 1997), at 14; see also Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics,
15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236 (2006); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why
Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every
Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1546 (1993) ("[A]n effort to legalize lesbian and gay marriage
would make a public critique of the institution of marriage impossible."). For a good overview of
the debates as well as interviews with same-sex couples regarding their perspective on marriage, see
KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE AND THE LAW 78-
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
but also upon exit.
Over forty years ago, as part of another "divorce revolution,"
legislatures enacted equitable distribution statutes to make divorce less
acrimonious and more gender equitable. Equitable distribution statutes
modernized divorce law by removing fault as a dispositive factor and
making economic partnership the cornerstone concept of property
division. Lawmakers sought to compensate housewives and mothers,
who were typically hurt financially by divorce, and to reflect the idea
that both partners in a marriage-the wage earner and the homemaker-
contributed to its economic success. Equitable distribution statutes gave
courts a directive and the means to properly remunerate the unpaid
contributions of one spouse to the other's career and to acknowledge that
couples acted in partnership as they acquired assets, developed skills,
and allocated marital roles. The promise of these statutes, however, was
never fully realized for different-sex couples and, as an increasing
number of same-sex divorces appear on matrimonial court dockets,
courts will be forced to grapple with unanswered questions about how to
make equitable distribution truly equitable.
Imagine this scenario: Two men living in New York have been in a
marriage-like relationship for over fifteen years. One is a partner at a
large law firm, and the other is a lawyer for a small non-profit
organization making considerably less money. They live together in an
apartment to which the law firm partner holds the title; he has furnished
their apartment, bought significant artwork for them to enjoy, and has
acquired several other types of collections, including a wine collection.
The non-profit lawyer pays for the majority of their monthly living
expenses as well as vacations. Moreover, the non-profit lawyer has made
himself available to travel with his partner for work, and has passed up
work opportunities in his own job to do so. When New York passed the
law enabling same-sex marriage, the couple availed themselves of this
legal right.4 After being married for a year, however, the couple decided
to divorce.
With significant resources at stake at the dissolution of this long-term
relationship, a judge will likely limit the marital property to assets
acquired and earnings generated during the brief period of legal
marriage, as prescribed by state divorce law. Despite the couple's legal
117(2006).
4. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2011) ("A marriage that is otherwise valid shall
be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or different sex.").
5. Jesse Green, From "I Do" to "I'm Done," NYMAG.COM (Feb. 24, 2013), http://nymag.com/
news/features/gay-divorce-2013 -3/ (noting "gay couples are at the start of a divorce boom").
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inability to marry in the first fifteen years of the relationship, those years
will not likely count for the purposes of the characterization and
distribution of marital property. Titled property will go to the title-
holder, and each party will have only the most limited rights to the
other's non-liquid assets, like pensions or patents. Furthermore, in cases
of income or earnings asymmetry, any likely award of maintenance or
rehabilitative alimony will be decreased because of the artificially short
length of the marital relationship. Finally, any career sacrifices that one
partner made in order to benefit the other will be un- or under-
compensated.
Same-sex divorce in cases such as this raises two major questions.
One question-a question that has plagued different-sex divorce and will
continue to produce inequality in same-sex divorce-is which assets
count as marital property and how courts should handle unresolved
questions about "career assets"-including enhanced earning capacity
and indirect spousal contributions to business ventures. These career
assets bring up the twin questions of individual accomplishment as well
as individual contribution to the relationship. The manner in which
courts have treated these particular career assets persistently belies the
ideal of economic partnership, and reinforces the idea that "he who earns
it, owns it."'6 Addressing career assets is critical. In high-wealth divorces,
they are worth significant amounts of money; in lower-wealth divorces,
they are often the only assets of value a couple possesses. On a
theoretical level, the question is important because conventional courts
engaging in equitable distribution have persistently undervalued the non-
earning spouse's contributions to the economic success of the marriage.
Taking economic partnership seriously requires broadening what counts
as marital property with respect to career assets and considering
enhanced earning capacity as marital property.
Another question-made salient during this exceptional time of
transitional rights for same-sex couples-is when an economic
partnership begins. Equitable distribution statutes posit the partnership
beginning at the moment of marriage. However, taking seriously the idea
of economic partnership-and, in this exceptional moment, recognizing
that some couples have been legally barred from marriage-how do
courts evaluate when a partnership begins? At what point are the
individuals in a romantic couple sufficiently committed to one another
that they should be allowed claims to one another's property? The tide of
6. Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2250
(1994).
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same-sex divorces that will inevitably rise-bringing with it new
"hybrid" cases that involve long-term cohabiting partners and short-term
marital partners-will push these legal questions into the foreground.7
State courts have taken on the question in the context of different-sex
marriages, providing examples of how marital property can be measured
from points other than marriage. Following these models, I propose that
courts use the category of "pre-marital" property in order to equitably
distribute property in hybrid cases. Enlarging the marital grid by
including pre-marital property in a marital estate instantiates the idea of
economic partnership and also helps equalize economic injustices that
may result from financial asymmetries and specialized household labor.
Answering questions about the practical goals and theoretical
grounding of equitable distribution at this moment in the evolution of
marriage law has great consequences. Which property counts and when
it gets counted impacts the ways in which spouses bargain with one
another, how diverse roles are valued in these bargains, and how we
assign and perform gender within marriage. Including career assets and
pre-marital property in marital estates will help courts actualize the
stated goals of equitable distribution by identifying marital property
according to economic partnership values rather than individual earning
or purchasing power. Genuine equitable distribution will benefit all
spouses who take on a non- or low-earning role in their partnerships-
whether to raise children, change careers, or pursue meaningful but
unremunerated work.
Achieving divorce equality is also important because longstanding
social policy and cultural norms promote the ideal of sharing in
marriage. The sharing norm has historically been evident in marital
property rules that discourage spouses from keeping an accounting of
debts and credits within marriage and that disallow most claims based on
this type of domestic accounting. The New Jersey Supreme Court has
stated: "Marriage is not a business arrangement in which the parties keep
track of debits and credits, their accounts to be settled upon divorce.
Rather, as we have said, 'marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint
undertaking..." 8 The goal from this perspective is to "devise a legal
framework for divorce that will safeguard those who do not maximize
their separate interests, but instead engage in unselfish, sharing
7. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court is currently considering this question in the case of Kinney
v. Busch. See Brief of Appellee, Kinney v. Busch, No. KEN-14-456, available at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/kinney-v-busch/kinney-v-busch-appellee-brief.pdf.
8. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (N.J. 1982) (citations omitted).
1250 [Vol. 90:1245
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behavior."9 Proper compensation through equitable distribution rewards
individuals for sharing and making choices that benefit the unit rather
than the individual, normatively positive behavior.
In previous scholarship, family law and feminist scholars
demonstrated great interest in the topic of equitable distribution as
statutes were enacted around the country. In the 1980s, scholars
produced a number of articles detailing the shifts in property regimes,
ordinarily focusing on divorce reform in a particular state.10 As courts
began to construe the statutes and award divorce settlement using the
new rubrics, scholars tracked the outcomes in order to gauge the efficacy
of the statutes."1 Since these first two waves of literature about equitable
distribution-the first primarily descriptive and the second evaluative-
there has been minimal discussion of the equitable distribution in legal
scholarship. 12 This Article builds on the body of evaluative literature
concerning equitable distribution, and adds to it by drawing on robust
literatures about marital bargaining 13 and the specialization of household
labor in both different- and same-sex marriage. 14
This Article uses same-sex divorce as a lens through which to
reexamine the aims and the actualities of equitable distribution as well as
the notion of economic partnership within intimate relationships. One
immediate goal is to provide a roadmap for thinking about the new
marital property claims that will arise during this transitional moment.
Same-sex couples currently going through property disputes at the
9. Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM
AT THE CROSSROADS 6, 31 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
10. See, e.g., Carmen Valle Patel, Treating Professional Goodwill as Marital Property in
Equitable Distribution States, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554 (1983); Sally Burnett Sharp, Equitable
Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A Preliminary Analysis, 61 N.C. L. REV. 247 (1983).
11. See generally DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 9; Marsha Garrison, Good
Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce
Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621 (1991); Symposium, Divorce and Feminist Legal Theory, 82
GEO. L.J. 2119 (1994).
12. There are some scholars who have taken up the question more recently. See, e.g., Alicia
Brokars Kelly, Rehabilitating Partnership Marriage as a Theory of Wealth Distribution at Divorce:
In Recognition ofa Shared Life, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 141, 167-76 (2004).
13. Social science literature about marital bargaining and the problem of career development for
women who are primary caretakers is extensive. See, e.g., ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT
(1989); RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND BARGAINING
POWER (1995); Williams, supra note 6.
14. See, e.g., Susan Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex
Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 98 (2005); Franke, supra note 3; Polikoff, supra note
2015] 1251
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dissolution of marriage provide a situationally unique and analytically
rich object of inquiry. The problems confronting these couples
underscore the limits of conventional marital property distribution and
revivify long-standing debates about the pitfalls and failures of equitable
distribution. A second goal is to understand how reshaping equitable
distribution rules to address same-sex divorce will ultimately benefit
both same- and different-sex couples by recalibrating the valuation of
unpaid or indirect spousal contributions and collapsing the gendered
framework that has supported marriage to date.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I discuss how states
adopted equitable distribution rules starting in the 1970s and how these
rules became the primary system of marital property division. I describe
how these new marital property rules formed part of more sweeping
divorce reform efforts, and were intended to implement a theory of
marriage as economic partnership. I analyze why equitable distribution
statutes have failed to create meaningful equality between partners at the
dissolution of relationships and what factors have obstructed the full
realization of the economic partnership ideal. Subsequently, I analyze
the problem that equitable distribution statutes were meant to solve:
specialization of household labor. I discuss this specialization of labor-
the marital bargain-in the traditional context of different-sex couples. I
also draw on recent sociological literature to examine how same-sex
couples organize household labor and whether they engage in similarly
gendered forms of specialized labor.
In Part II, I discuss how courts have resisted characterizing certain
career assets as marital property, just as they have resisted equal division
of business assets even when one spouse has made significant indirect
contributions to the business. I discuss how professional degrees,
enhanced earning capacity, and the valuation of spousal contributions to
corporate enterprises remain carve-outs from the more general policy of
using property to compensate non- or low-earning spouses. I also
analyze how courts resist characterizing these assets as marital property
and discuss why distribution and spousal-maintenance awards are
inadequate solutions to the problems of asset characterization. Finally, I
argue that courts should define enhanced earning capacity broadly and
characterize it as marital property, and I provide models from New York
case law that demonstrate how courts can realize the values of economic
partnership.
In Part III, I analyze the question of when an economic partnership
begins. I examine how courts have addressed questions surrounding
property division in different-sex "hybrid" relationships and propose that
courts adopt the category of pre-marital property to address the
1252 [Vol. 90:1245
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particular difficulties of hybrid relationships. I also propose a modified
formalist framework for assessing when the counting of pre-marital
property begins, one that recognizes autonomous decisions to remain off
the marital grid and relies on myriad legal markers to indicate intent to
form both a legal relationship and an economic partnership. For
example, in the case of same-sex partners, some couples will have
entered into domestic partnerships, or civil unions. Moreover, many
same-sex couples have purposefully engaged in private contracting and
estate planning, such that courts will have other evidence relating to a
couple's wishes about property distribution and their level of financial
commitment to one another. These types of indicators, I argue, are legal
markers that may indicate an economic partnership.
Ultimately, same-sex divorce underscores the need for a
reexamination of and recommitment to our guiding theories of marital
property. If we are to take seriously the notion that marriage is an
economic partnership we must look beyond the strict confines of the
marriage license and consider the probability that economic partnerships
begin before marriage licensing. Similarly, we must reconsider what
counts as marital property. The solutions I propose are more responsive
to the marital bargains that both same- and different-sex couples make
because they take into account household specialization of labor and
recognize spousal contributions that are currently going un- or under-
valued. These solutions will help equalize the gendered effects of
marriage and advance the goals of divorce equality.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE MARITAL BARGAIN
Most systems of property ownership are based on explicit
understandings of resource use, allocation, and sharing. Property
ownership within marriage is distinct because it involves agreements
about how to pool resources, including human capital, that are largely
tacit. Because of these norms of shared assets and shared work, disputes
about resources and household work are common. It is not until divorce,
however, that the ownership of household assets becomes truly
contested. Moreover, as Lawrence Waggoner has observed, divorce
might be considered unusual in the context of property ownership
because the law, rather than the legal owner of the property, "makes the
crucial allocative decision [at divorce]. 15
Traditionally, at the dissolution of a marriage, assets went to the
15. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REV. 21, 23
(1994). This is presuming the absence of an antenuptial agreement.
20151 1253
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individual who held title to the asset, usually the husband. This common
law approach to marital property derived from the English coverture
framework, which gave the husband all property rights both during and
after marriage, and disallowed most property ownership for women
within marriage. This long-standing method of property division
remained in place, mitigated by alimony awards, until the divorce
reforms of the 1970s and 1980s. In this Part, I discuss the problems with
the title-based theories of property division that led to the divorce
reforms and the creation of the equitable distribution statutes.
Legislatures and courts aspired, as I demonstrate, to install a new
conception of marriage-marriage as economic partnership-through
the enactment of these statutes. I evaluate the limited success that the
statutes had as safeguards against economic unfairness, and
subsequently analyze the problem that equitable distribution statutes
were meant to solve-the perceived need to compensate wives for
fulfilling their unpaid role as prescribed by the marital bargain. The
conventional bargain, as it has existed between different-sex couples, is
rooted in specialization of labor, economic dependency, and gender
difference. I evaluate how this bargain works for different-sex couples
and how same-sex couples may or may not be updating this marital
bargain by de-gendering marriage.
A. Establishing Economic Partnership
In the 1970s and 1980s, along with no-fault divorce, states enacted
equitable distribution statutes (or adopted community property rules)' 6
that ushered in a new regime of marital property division. Equitable
distribution statutes required courts to look beyond title-as well as
marital fault-and created the statutory categories of marital and
separate property. Once a court determined the extent of a couple's
marital property-their marital estate-it then divided the marital
property either equally or equitably, pursuant to the state statutory
system. These statutes were seen as necessary to safeguard housewives
against what were, for them, the detrimental consequences of divorce.
These statutes and the judicial gloss that courts supplied framed the
marital relationship as an economic partnership, thereby trying to
16. 1 am bracketing the discussion of community property rules and focus, in this Article,
solely on equitable distribution states. Currently there are nine community property states: Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See
generally William A. Reppy, Jr., Major Events in the Evolution of American Community Property
Law and Their Import to Equitable Distribution States, 23 FAM. L.Q. 163 (1989).
1254 [Vol. 90:1245
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capture the contributions of both wage earners and homemakers. The
focus of marital property division shifted, accordingly, away from fault
inquiries to inquiries about spousal contributions to the marriage. In this
section, I describe these changes in the marital property rules and their
mixed success.
1. Equitable Distribution and the Divorce Revolution
Prior to the divorce reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, states uniformly
awarded property based on title holding at the dissolution of a marriage.
This system derived from English common law heritage. Under rules of
coverture, a married woman was unable to own property while married,
with limited exceptions, and her husband controlled all of her non-trust
property. 17 Upon separation or divorce (which was rare and difficult to
obtain), a husband was entitled to everything except for a wife's real
property and assets placed in separate trust.' 8 After the statutory
enactments that granted married women the right to own and control
property, the "reformed" common law approach identified "two distinct
interests, the husband's separate property and the wife's separate
property. Common ownership [was] brought into being only when one
or both spouses elect[ed] to hold property in both names."' 9 At divorce,
all property remained with the title-holder, and the emphasis was placed
squarely on individual earning, ownership, and investment.2°
17. All "moveables" or "chattels"-which included money, clothing, jewelry, furniture, and
other personal goods-became the property of the husband, as did any leasehold land. A wife's
dowry, or portion, also came under the control of her husband. A married woman retained title to
her freehold, and in theory the husband could not dispose of it without her consent. However, a wife
had no right to any income the property produced. AMY LOUISE ERICKSON, WOMEN AND PROPERTY
IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 103-13 (1993). Women could, however, have assets placed in trust
for their benefit. See Allison Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the
Married Woman's Separate Estate, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 167 (2014). For a good
overview of the complexity of coverture, see generally MARRIED WOMEN AND THE LAW:
COVERTURE IN ENGLAND AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD (Tim Stretton & Krista Kesselring eds.,
2013) [hereinafter MARRIED WOMEN AND THE LAW].
18. See EILEEN SPRING, LAW, LAND, AND FAMILY: ARISTOCRATIC INHERITANCE IN
ENGLAND 1300 TO 1800 8-66 (1993); SUSAN STAVES, MARRIED WOMEN'S SEPARATE PROPERTY IN
ENGLAND 1660-1833 (1990); MARRIED WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 17; Tait, supra note 17
(discussing traditional rules of coverture).
19. Susan Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in California's Community
Property System, 1849-1975, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1976); see also Waggoner, supra note 15, at
24.
20. If the husband held all the property and assets in his name, courts mitigated the inequity
through alimony awards, which were often indexed to fault. Deborah H. Bell, Equitable
Distribution: Implementing the Marital Partnership Theory Through the Dual Classification
System, 67 MISS. L.J. 115, 117-20 (1997).
2015] 1255
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By the mid-twentieth century, as divorce rates began to rise21 and the
problems with fault-based divorce became clear, a range of groups-
including some feminist organizations 22-began to push for divorce
reform. Reformers focused their efforts on the adoption of no-fault
divorce rules, which allowed couples to divorce without proving fault
and being forced to manufacture evidence of adultery.23 Equitable
distribution statutes were related to this reform because they generally
barred marital fault from being a consideration in property distribution.24
Equitable distribution statutes were also, however, designed to address
the problems inherent in the position of a homemaker upon divorce: "By
the middle of the twentieth century, critics attacked the title system as
unfair to traditional homemakers. They argued that the homemaker's
valuable contribution to the marital unit was completely ignored by a
system that awarded all property to the wage-earner., 25 Those fighting to
recognize the labor of homemakers included both feminist groups, such
as the National Organization for Women, as well as more conservative
constituencies, including the family law bar in many states.26
The idea of equitable distribution arose in policy papers and reports as
early as 1963. In that year's Report of the Committee on Civil and
Political Rights to the President's Commission on the Status of Women,
the report authors observed that:
21. See Garrison, supra note 11.
22. See id. (arguing feminist groups focused primarily on ERA efforts but also, contrary to
conventional story, did advocate for divorce reform).
23. See id; HERBERT JACOB, THE SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1983); Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on
Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 130, 130 ("Rather, no-fault
divorce primarily sought to rid domestic relations law of the bad features of the old system-bitter
recriminations, private detectives, cooperative lying about adultery, the stigma of being divorced,
and so on.").
24. Martha L. Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for
Distribution of Property at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 279,286 (1989). There has been much discussion
around the data in Weitzman's book and, according to even Weitzman's admission, some of the
data is incorrect. However, all data confirms the general trends and outcomes that Weitzman
identified in her book. Very few states, like North Carolina, still include fault as a factor. See
LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985).
25. See Bell, supra note 20, at 122-23 (citations omitted).
26. Mary Zeigler, An Incomplete Revolution: Feminists and the Legacy of Marital-Property
Reform, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 259, 261 (2013) ("By the late 1970s, NOW responded by
campaigning for 'pro-homemaker' divorce reforms: measures such as those calling for equal or
equitable distribution of marital property and laws recognizing the contributions of homemakers in
the division of marital property."); see also Suzanne Kahn, Chapter 1: Alimony Drones, Breeding
Cows, and Displaced Homemakers: Women Find Their Way Through the Divorce Law Revolution
(May 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with author).
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Marriage as a partnership in which each spouse makes a
different but equally important contribution is increasingly
recognized .... During marriage, each spouse should have a
legally defined substantial right in the earnings of the other, in
the real and personal property acquired through those earnings,
and in their management. Such a right should be legally
recognized as surviving the marriage in the event of its
27termination.
The Committee recommended changes to laws concerning alimony,
support, and property settlements.28
California was the first state to act on these recommendations, thanks
in large part to the efforts of Herma Hill Kay and her associates.
California enacted no-fault divorce in 1969, simultaneously establishing
a community property system.29 California's new divorce rules
subsequently served as a model for the drafting of the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act (UMDA), which introduced the idea of equitable
distribution. Aligned with the idea that fault was not to be a factor in
either granting the divorce or awarding property, the prefatory note to
the UMDA stated that property distribution at divorce was to be treated,
as nearly as possible, "like the distribution of assets incident to the
dissolution of a partnership. 30 Courts were charged with distributing
marital property "without regard to marital misconduct, in just
proportions after considering all relevant factors., 31 The first factor was
the "contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property,
including contribution of a spouse as homemaker. 3 2
The UMDA was thereafter promulgated by the Uniform Law
Commission in 1971 and approved by the American Bar Association,
after much debate, in 1974. 33 The majority of states followed
27. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 47 (1963).
28. Id. at 48.
29. See Kay, supra note 9, at 6-9 (noting California was the first state to abolish traditional
fault-based grounds for divorce and to substitute factual finding of marriage breakdown in their
place, and California no-fault divorce law became effective in 1970 in context of community-
property marital regime).
30. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 177, at 4 (1973).
31. Id. § 307.
32. Id. Other factors included (2) value of the property set apart to each spouse; (3) duration
of the marriage; and (4) economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property was
to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live
therein for a reasonable period to the spouse having custody of any children. Id.
33. See generally Kahn, supra note 26.
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California's lead and changed their divorce laws. The journey to full
national acceptance of equitable distribution rules was, however,
protracted; it took several decades for the majority of states to enact
equitable distribution statutes. State by state, legislatures and family law
bars debated the wisdom of the proposed UMDA and mostly adopted
pieces of the model legislation without fully adopting it. By 1983,
twenty-two states had adopted some kind of equitable distribution
statute,34 and by 2014 there were forty-one equitable distribution states.35
At present, all states have adopted either equitable distribution or
community property principles, and state legislatures have entirely
eliminated title-based systems.
In the space of little more than two decades, then, the common law
theory of marital property had been transformed through statutory
reform to such a degree that equitable distribution statutes were the new
normal. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated in Painter v. Painter36:
"Today in the laws of many other states, in words very similar to those
found in our statute, provision is made for the fair and equitable
distribution of marital assets in the event of divorce. 37 State courts
charged with interpreting the parameters of equitable distribution results
also understood the legislative charge of putting into practice the
principle of marriage as an economic partnership. In 1974, in a leading
early case concerning New Jersey's equitable distribution statute,
Rothman v. Rothman,38 the State Supreme Court observed:
[The statute] gives recognition to the essential supportive role
played by the wife in the home, acknowledging that as
homemaker, wife and mother she should clearly be entitled to a
share of family assets accumulated during the marriage. Thus
the division of property upon divorce is responsive to the
concept that marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking,
that in many ways it is akin to a partnership.39
As state courts increasingly evaluated cases using equitable distribution
34. See Zeigler, supra note 26, at 261 ("Equitable property division, rare in 1970, became the
norm in all but ten states by the mid-1980s. Whereas no states had property-division rules
recognizing the contributions of homemakers in 1968, 22 states had adopted such a policy by 1983."
(citations omitted)).
35. These states comprise all of the states that are not community property states. See Kay,
supra note 9, at 6.
36. 320 A.2d 484 (N.J. 1974).
37. Id. at491.
38. 320 A.2d 496 (N.J. 1974).
39. Id. at 501.
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statutes, they repeated the mantra of marriage as economic partnership. 40
Just over ten years after Rothman, the North Carolina Supreme Court
remarked:
[T]he General Assembly sought to alleviate the unfairness of the
common law rule by enacting our Equitable Distribution
Act . . . [which] reflects the idea that marriage is a partnership
enterprise to which both spouses make vital contributions and
which entitles the homemaker spouse to a share of the property
acquired during the relationship.41
Another decade later, in Mississippi, the State Supreme Court reiterated
that marriage was a partnership enterprise in justifying the equitable
distribution of marital assets:
Most parties enter into marriage with no estate and proceed to
build an estate together. Therefore, in the event of a divorce,
there is more often than not one estate. If the breadwinner
happens to be the husband and has all property in his name, this
serves to relegate the non-breadwinner wife to the equivalent of
a maid-and upon division of the marital estate entitled to a
minimum wage credit for her homemaking service. We abandon
such an approach. We, today, recognize that marital partners can
be equal contributors whether or not they both are at work in the
marketplace.42
Modem marriage was an economic partnership, and modern divorce was
the dissolution of this economic partnership. By the 1990s, these notions
had become entrenched in legal language and culture.4 3
40. See, e.g., Cassiday v. Cassiday, 716 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Haw. 1986) ("These decisions are
consistent with the time honored proposition that marriage is a partnership to which both partners
bring their financial resources as well as their individual energies and efforts."); Williams v.
Williams, 354 S.E.2d 64, 66 (Va. 1987) ("The 'equitable distribution' statute, however, is intended
to recognize a marriage as a partnership and to provide a means to divide equitably the wealth
accumulated during and by that partnership based on the monetary and non-monetary contributions
of each spouse."); Lacey v. Lacey, 173 N.W.2d 142, 144-45 (Wis. 1970) ("The division of the
property of the divorced parties rests upon the concept of marriage as a shared enterprise or joint
undertaking. It is literally a partnership, although a partnership in which contributions and equities
of the partners may and do differ from individual case to individual case.").
41. White v. White, 324 S.E.2d 829, 831-32 (N.C. 1985).
42. Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994).
43. The concept of marriage as an economic partnership has given rise to a body of literature
comparing the marital partnership to other, corporate forms of partnership. See, e.g., Bea Ann
Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689
(1990).
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2. The Mixed Results of Equitable Distribution
Despite grandiose statements from courts and legislatures about
marriage as a partnership, equitable distribution statutes did not always
alleviate economic inequality between spouses post-divorce. Rather,
there was a growing consensus in the years following the adoption of
equitable distribution rules that the new laws had not "lived up to their
promise of providing a fair apportionment of assets between the
parties. ' '44 Marsha Garrison's leading 1991 study of how courts in three
New York counties treated property and alimony found that new
property distributions "failed to provide major benefits to divorced
wives" '45 and that, simultaneously, the "alimony prospects" of long-term
homemakers were significantly reduced.46 Deborah Rhode and Martha
Minow likewise observed that equitable distribution statutes actually
produced a "[s]harp decline in single women's standards of living
following divorce ' 47 and exacerbated the "feminization of poverty. 48
One of the major problems in implementation was the scope and
characterization of the marital estate-in other words, what counted as
marital property. 49 Rhode and Minow noted: "Part of the problem lies in
the restrictive definition of property belonging to the community...
Garrison found, from the outset, that husbands in her sample group were
more likely to possess separate property than their wives and
consequently left the marriage with a higher level of assets. But the fact
that courts characterized key non-liquid assets, such as professional
degrees and other "career assets," 5' as separate from the marital estate
44. Kay, supra note 9, at 12.
45. Garrison, supra note 11, at 739.
46. Id.
47. Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms:
Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at
191, 197; see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property
Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2318 (1994) ("[T]he years since the enactment of the initial no-fault
divorce reforms have made it clear that women tend to fare far worse financially as a result of
divorce than men.").
48. Rhode & Minow, supra note 47, at 197; see also MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF
EQUALITY 38 (1991) (arguing that single-parent families headed by women are the "new poor").
49. Before a court values and distributes marital property, it first characterizes the property as
either separate or marital. Property acquired before the marriage, as well as gifts or bequests
received by one member of the couple during marriage, remain separate property. Everything else,
generally, is marital property.
50. Rhode & Minow, supra note 47, at 200.
51. Lenore Weitzman defined career assets as "a large array of specific assets such as pension
and retirement benefits, a license to practice a profession or trade, medical and hospital insurance,
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was even more detrimental to the goals of equitable distribution. For
example, many states did not initially count pensions as part of the
marital estate. New York did not do so until 1984, following Majauskas
v. Majauskas.52 The Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 53 which required
private pension plans to comply with court orders in the context of
divorce decrees, facilitated a nationwide shift toward including pensions
in the marital estate.54 Pension assets are now uniformly included in the
marital estate and are one of the most common forms of wealth within
marriage. Likewise, courts that were originally vexed by how to
characterize and value both patents and professional goodwill, other
assets that often represent a future rather than present income stream,
now routinely include these assets in the marital estate.
Contrarily, almost all state courts, with the exception of New York,
have ruled that professional degrees cannot count as marital property.55
Indeed, courts almost uniformly refuse to characterize either
professional degrees or any form of enhanced earning capacity as marital
property. This leaves one spouse's contributions to the other spouse's
education and career un- or under-valued. This undervaluation is
problematic in both low-asset marriages, because enhanced earning
capacity is one of the only significant assets, and in long-term marriages,
because wives often emerge with no experience in the labor market and
little earning potential. 6 In addition, courts have uniformly resisted
awarding equal percentages of family businesses or other closely held
corporate shares to divorcing wives, even when the marriage is a long-
term one in which the wife acted as homemaker and caretaker for a
significant period of time. 7
Problems characterizing the marital estate have subsequently resulted
the goodwill of a business, and entitlements to company goods and services," and labeled them
"The New Property." See WEITZMAN, supra note 24, at 110.
52. 463 N.E.2d 15, 17 (N.Y. 1984) ("Vested rights in a noncontributory pension plan are
marital property to the extent that they were acquired between the date of the marriage and the
commencement of a matrimonial action, even though the rights are unmatured at the time the action
is begun."). The case involved a police officer who argued that his pension was not marital property
during the divorce proceedings. The couple owned no other property and the court awarded the wife
"maintenance of $43 per week, to be reduced if defendant obtained employment by $1 per week for
every $3 of her gross earnings." Id. at 18.
53. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
54. WEITZMAN, supra note 24, at 115.
55. See infra Part II.A. 1 (discussing professional degrees as marital property).
56. See infra Part II.A (discussing career assets as marital property).
57. See infra Part II (for a more in-depth discussion of the problem of career assets).
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in economic inequalities at divorce. Exacerbating these problems is the
fact that the adoption of equitable distribution rules has rendered courts
less likely to make substantial alimony awards. Once courts adopted the"equal partnership" model, the theory held that property division would
adequately provide for both parties. "To the extent that the marriage left
one spouse financially dependent on the other, property division, rather
than alimony, would be used to address that dependency since property
could be divided at the time of divorce. 58 Relatedly, alimony also
contravened the desire of reformers to establish divorce rules that would
facilitate a clean break between the parties.59 Consequently, one of
Garrison's major findings was a significant decrease in the frequency
and amount of alimony awards, even in long-term marriages. 60 Rejecting
permanent alimony and large alimony awards, state courts focused
primarily on rehabilitative alimony, giving the wife time-limited
payments that allowed her to obtain additional job training or education
in order to enter the paid labor market. Because, as Garrison also found,
most couples had little property to divide, the decrease in alimony
awards was an obstacle to adequately provisioning an economic
dependent post-divorce. "[R]eformers realized that women were not
equals in the marketplace, 61 nevertheless equitable distribution statutes
did not always meet the challenge of equalizing parties post-divorce.
B. Specialized Labor and Spousal Contributions
The primary reason that reformers sought to change the marital
property division rules was that the old rules did not compensate wives
who stayed at home and specialized their labor according to cultural
norms and gender stereotypes. The original marital bargain-hammered
out in both legal rules and the social imagination-posited the husband
and wife existing in two distinct but complementary roles. The husband
58. Jana Singer, Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why the Shoe Won't Fit, 31 FAM.
L.Q. 119, 120 (1997); see also Regan, supra note 47, at 2315 ("[M]ost states treat property division
as the primary vehicle for financial adjustments, creating a presumption against alimony or
maintenance that can only be rebutted by demonstrating that an equitable property division still
leaves a spouse in dire financial condition.").
59. Singer, supra note 58, at 121 ("[T]he no-fault divorce philosophy appeared to absolve
divorcing spouses of responsibility for each other's financial well-being. As a result, facilitating a
clean financial break replaced punishing a guilty spouse (or protecting an innocent one) as the
overriding objective of divorce-related financial adjustments."); see also Regan, supra note 47, at
2316 ("Divorce law therefore now regards divorce primarily as transforming spouses into
strangers.").
60. See Garrison, supra note 11, at 634.
61. Id. at 630.
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earned income and acted as head of household. The wife provided
domestic services and childcare. Equitable distribution rules were
designed to better account for this particular householding pattern. In
this section, I discuss the specialization of household labor-the marital
bargain-and how it has both persisted and evolved in the wake of social
change for women and the advent of same-sex marriage.
1. The Original Marital Bargain: Different-Sex Couples
The conventional marital bargain is encapsulated in the ubiquitous
narrative of the separate spheres. In this story, women "live in a distinct'world,' engaged in nurturant activities, focused on children, husbands,
and family dependents. 62 Men, on the other hand, participate in the
world of the marketplace, earning income and representing the
household in the economic and political worlds. The bargain, originally
written into English coverture rules and domestic relations law, was that
the husband had a duty to support his wife since social norms prevented
her from earning income.63 Husbands owed their wives alimony or"separate maintenance" when the couple lived apart, and couples rarely
divorced.64 In the modem context, specialization of labor continues to
occur and modem economists, most famously Gary Becker, have
explained and justified this gendered labor specialization on efficiency
grounds.65 Becker has argued that "[i]ncreasing returns from specialized
human capital is a powerful force creating a division of labor in the
allocation of time and investments in human capital between married
men and married women., 66
Moreover, despite the fact that patterns of work and caretaking have
shifted in the last decades "[a]mong heterosexual couples, within-couple
inequalities have persisted in terms of earnings and time spent on
household labor, even as women have been more fully integrated into
the paid labor market., 67 And even when participating in the paid labor
market, wives take on a larger share of housework and childcare than
62. Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's Place: The Rhetoric of
Women's History, 75 J. AM. HIST. 9, 10 (1988).
63. Class, as historians have noted, has complicated this bargain, at all times. See id at 12.
64. See Tait, supra note 17, at 13.
65. Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. LAB. &
ECON. S33, S33 (1985).
66. Id.
67. Katherine Weisshaar, Earnings Equality and Relationship Stability for Same-Sex and
Heterosexual Couples, 93 SOC. FORCES 93, 96 (2014); see also Alicia Brokars Kelly, Navigating
Gender in Modern Intimate Partnership Law, 14 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 10-20 (2012).
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their spouses.68 Furthermore, wives have traditionally been more willing
to engage in part-time labor or commit themselves to underemployment
in order to be the primary caretaker for children and to allow their
spouses to maximize their work productivity. 69 Even couples who strive
to be egalitarian by dividing up earnings, chores, and carework end up
with an unequal division of household labor in which the wife ends up
taking on a larger share of the unseen work of household administration,"second shift" work.70 And while a couple may jointly benefit from
specializing labor, the problem for women is that "housework
responsibilities lower the earnings and affect the jobs of married women
by reducing their time in the labor force and discouraging their
investment in market human capital.' Upon divorce, wives are left
underinvested in their human capital, and the unpaid contributions they
have made to the success of the marital enterprise are undercompensated
because these contributions cannot be characterized as property. 72
Current divorce laws fail to capture the myriad sacrifices and unpaid
contributions that spouses, usually wives, make. In a modern context,
one in which women are strong participants in the labor market and men
are doing an increasing amount of caretaking, these sacrifices and
unpaid contributions take on many forms. For some couples, marriage
may still mean that spouses take on highly gendered roles and divide
labor between the home and the market. One partner might forgo paid
employment entirely to help manage the home and raise children while
68. See MARTHA ERTMAN, LOVE'S PROMISES 126 (2015) ("On an average day in 2012, only
20 percent of men did housework like cleaning or laundry, compared with 48 percent of women.").
69. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Work Wives, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 345, 381 (2013).
Because of the persistence of the gendering of roles, many individuals-including working
women-say they need "wives." What this means is that:
[T]he speaker desires someone in her (or his) life who will pick up the dry cleaning, keep track
of appointments, do the laundry, take the kids to soccer practice, get dinner on the table,
manage the social calendar, and vacuum, dust, and scour the tub. In other words, the speaker
wants someone to perform the caregiving tasks that legal wives previously were required to
perform when marriage was a gendered hierarchy, with men at the top and women at the
bottom.
Id.
70. See generally HOCHSCHILD, supra note 13 (examining division of housework and
childcare duties among "dual-career," opposite-sex couples); MAHONY, supra note 13.
71. Becker, supra note 65, at S55.
72. Deborah Widiss speculates that there is "a disconnect in a structure of marriage law that
encourages specialization during marriage but that, upon divorce, treats such specialization as an
individual choice for which the dependent spouse must bear the brunt of the consequences."
Deborah A. Widiss, Reconfiguring Sex, Gender, and the Law of Marriage, 50 FAM. CT. REv. 205,
211 (2012).
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her partner earns the income and invests in his career.73 On the opposite
end of the spectrum, there are partnerships in which both parties are
earners and have similar levels of education and income. These more
egalitarian couples might share the burdens of housework and income
generation just as they share other resources. Even in these relationships,
however, partners bargain, make trade-offs, and distribute the work of
running a household.74 Even in equal partnerships, spouses must co-
operate and negotiate as they "engage in a variety of collective projects,
including child rearing, broader family relationships, friendships, and the
common management of resources-a household, investments, and
careers." 75
In addition, many marriages go through periods when one spouse
takes a career break, makes a career transition or goes through any other
prolonged period of nonearning.76 In some marriages, one partner might
take on the role of earner while the other obtains additional education,
starts a new career venture, or looks for work in a bad economy.
Alternatively, one partner may take a job with excellent compensation
that allows the other to work in a personally meaningful but not highly
paid job. Or, one partner may take a lower paying job or forgo career
opportunities in order to allow the other partner to make critical career
moves and relocate. These choices are sometimes reciprocal and, at
various points in a partnership, individuals may switch roles, such that
both partners have the chance to take risks and explore new career
opportunities. As Milton Regan has observed: "Members of [a]
partnership make a host of subtle contributions and sacrifices in reliance
73. See Regan, supra note 47, at 2320 ("Seen as an economic partnership, marriage often
reflects a joint effort to enhance the human capital of one spouse as part of a strategy to maximize
total household income."). Therefore, despite the need and desire of some women to participate
fully in the paid labor force, the fact that they have lower paying jobs sometimes enables couples to
rationalize devoting the marital resources to supporting the husband in his career rather than the
wife. See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMtLY 41, 44 (2d ed. 1993); Margaret Brining,
Property Distribution Physics: The Talisman of Time and Middle Class Law, 31 FAM. L.Q. 93,
103-04 (1997).
74. Even couples without children must allocate "admin." See Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin,
104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015). See generally MAHONY, supra note 13, for more on the ways
couples bargain.
75. Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 82
(2004).
76. In a modem context, it is also less likely that families can afford to have one partner out of
the paid workforce. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Whither/Wither Alimony?, 93 TEX. L. REV.
925, 927 (2015) ("We believe that it is entirely plausible that most couples today enter marriage
believing that neither will or should assume a full-time caretaking role and that even if a spouse
does, he or she must be prepared to resume paid employment in fairly short order in accordance
with the family's needs.").
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on continuation of a shared life together." 77
In addition, children generate and intensify issues of career sacrifice
and underemployment. Childcare makes demands of a couple that are
unique and, when children arrive, spouses are more likely to engage in
specialization of labor such that one person is the primary caretaker and
one the primary economic earner.78 Some primary caretakers may still
work, but forgo career opportunities that would necessitate long hours or
significant travel in order to be available and at home. These individuals
may choose various forms of contingent labor, part-time work, or other
forms of the "mommy track., 79 Moreover, even individuals who choose
to forgo paid employment for only a brief period while the children are
very young sacrifice prime years in the paid labor market and often find
themselves on career "off-ramps" that can be overcome only with great
effort.8° Consequently, "the responsibility of married women for child
care and other housework has major implications for earnings and
occupational differences between men and women even aside from the
effect on the labor force participation of married women." 81
Ultimately, spouses bargain with one another in multiple ways as they
navigate the difficulties of developing two careers, caretaking for
children and sometimes parents, and maintaining a home.82 This
bargaining involves navigating gender roles-perhaps introducing
gender deviance into the equation by allocating responsibilities in
nontraditional ways-as well as earning capacities, work preferences,
and household needs.83 Spouses are sometimes very explicit about the
77. See Regan, supra note 47, at 2387.
78. BECKER, supra note 73, at 37-38; Gary S. Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time, 75
ECON. J. 493, 512 (1991).
79. See, e.g., Rebecca Korzec, Working on the Mommy-Track: Motherhood and Women
Lawyers, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 117 (1997); Elizabeth Ty Wilde et al., The Mommy Track
Divides: The Impact of Childbearing on Wages of Women ofDiffering Skill Levels (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16582, 2010), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16582.
80. See generally SYLVIA ANN HEwlTr, CREATING A LIFE: PROFESSIONAL WOMEN AND THE
QUEST FOR CHILDREN (2002). See also ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE
MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED (lst ed., 2001); Williams, supra
note 6.
81. Becker, supra note 65, at S55.
82. See MAHONY, supra note 13, for examples of how spouses negotiate.
83. See Kelly, supra note 67, at 31-33. Different-sex couples may engage in gender "deviant"
behavior in which they test, stretch, and reverse gender roles. When men engage in caretaking,
however, they often encounter the same concerns and obstacles as women do. See Joan C. Williams
& Allison Tait, Mancession or "Momcession "?: Good Providers, a Bad Economy, and Gender
Discrimination, 86 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 857, 865 (2011).
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terms of their economic partnerships, discussing how to divide their time
in order to meet family needs. Other times, individuals sink into certain
roles through trial and error, without much discussion, finally settling on
a pattern that works. In both cases, individuals usually make these
sacrifices operating on the unspoken understanding that they will be both
provisioned and protected by their marital status.
At divorce, not all bargains will or should cause judicial concern.
Some sacrifice is endemic to the state of marriage. There are the daily
bargains-the work of sharing-that marriages are built on, and these
series of small sacrifices do not necessarily demand accounting at the
moment of property division. Moreover, marriage should not be a ledger
of debits and credits that spouses calculate and recalculate daily.
Nonetheless, certain marital bargains in which economic dependency
exists alongside sacrifice of income and opportunity are a cause for
judicial concern. Certain marital bargains that depend on labor
specialization, and that are enriched by the unpaid contributions of one
spouse-these are the divorces in which marital property must be
reimagined in order to reflect the bargains made by partners during the
84intact marriage.
2. Updating the Marital Bargain: Same-Sex Couples
Marriage has conventionally been a foundational site for the creation
of gender and the marital bargain has been the template for shaping
gender. More recently, same-sex marriage has been celebrated as an
evolutionary event in the history of marriage that will help decrease the
persistence of gender-role typecasting and specialized labor within
marriage. 85 Nan Hunter has observed that same-sex couples differ from
different-sex couples in important ways with respect to "household
labor, sexual exclusivity, and child rearing," all of which have been
traditionally "associated with the legal definition of marriage. 86 Some
scholars have suggested that same-sex marriage has the potential to
provide a new model for marriage by creating marriages that are "empty
of gendering processes and practices," as opposed to different-sex
84. In addition, as Robert Mnookin and Lewis Komhauser have demonstrated, "rules and
procedures used in court for adjudicating disputes affect the bargaining process that occurs between
divorcing couples outside the courtroom." Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979) (emphasis in original).
85. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 3, at 18-19.
86. Nan D. Hunter, Introduction: The Future Impact of Same-Sex Marriage: More Questions
than Answers, 100 GEO. L.J. 1855, 1865 (2012).
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marriages that are "gender-full. 8 1
In support of this theory, a number of studies have shown that, in
terms of labor specialization, same-sex couples adopt a more egalitarian
approach: "Much research on same-sex domesticity points to a strong
egalitarian ideal for division of labour, a reluctance for one spouse to be
dependent on the other, and an emphasis on negotiation., 88 Instead of
allocating household labor by gender (wife cooks dinner, husband takes
out the trash), "most couples in same-sex relationships do not assign
gender roles. The tasks are flexible, often interchangeable between the
partners and are often divided by time, ability, and consideration. 8 9 This
egalitarian concept of domestic labor and marital bargaining correlates
with the fact that "most gay men and lesbians are in dual-earner
relationships, so neither partner is the exclusive breadwinner and each
partner has some measure of economic independence." 90
Nonetheless, studies also show that same-sex couples still adopt
default patterns of specialized labor within the household, even while
preferring a narrative of equality within marriage. One leading study
from the 1990s found that, in seventy-five percent of same-sex
relationships, one member of the couple "specialize[d] in domesticity.,"91
This tendency to specialize, as with different-sex marriages, increased
with the length of the relationship. Therefore, in opposition to the stated
desire for and engagement in equal relationships, "some same-sex
couples were observed to be enacting a fairly segregated, or specialized,
division of labor, whereby one partner concentrated more of his or her
energies in domestic work and one partner was more heavily involved in
87. Abbie E. Goldberg, "Doing" and "Undoing" Gender: The Meaning and Division of
Housework in Same-Sex Couples, 5 J. FAM. THEORY & REv. 85, 88 (2013).
88. Robert Leckey, Marriage and the Data on Same-Sex Couples, 35 J. SOC. WELFARE &
FAM. L. 179, 182 (2013); see also Charlotte Patterson, Family Lives of Lesbian and Gay Adults, in
HANDBOOK OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 659, 661 (Gary W. Peterson & Kevin R. Bush eds., 3d
ed. 2013) ("Lesbian and gay couples report that egalitarian ways of dividing up labor are the most
common."); Goldberg, supra note 87, at 87 ("This literature is consistent in suggesting that same-
sex couples divide housework more equally than heterosexual couples."). Suzanne Kim's work on
name changes within same-sex marriage also bears out the importance of the equality norm for
same-sex couples. See Suzanne Kim, Social Rites of Marriage (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
89. Suzanne Taylor Sutphin, Social Exchange Theory and the Division of Household Labor in
Same-Sex Couples, 46 MARRIAGE & FAM. REv. 191, 195 (2010).
90. Letitia Anne Peplau & Adam W. Fingerhut, The Close Relationships of Lesbians and Gay
Men, 58 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 405, 408 (2007).
91. CARRINGTON, No PLACE LIKE HOME: RELATIONSHIPS AND FAMILY LIFE AMONG
LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 187 (1999).
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the paid employment sphere., 92 Similar to egalitarian-minded different-
sex couples, same-sex couples generally appear held to a vision of
equality within marriage that may "mask substantial observable
differences between partners' actual contributions. 93
These findings, that same-sex couples specialize labor, dovetail with
related studies that posit specialization of labor according to social
exchange theory. Social exchange theory "predicts that greater power
accrues to the partner who has relatively greater personal resources, such
as education, money, or social standing. 94 This prediction has proved
true with both different- and same-sex couples. 95 In the context of same-
sex relationships, studies have found that "older, wealthier men
generally had more power in their intimate relationships" and that "the
partner with greater financial resources had more power in money
management issues" in gay but not lesbian couples.96 Gay men, like their
straight counterparts, tend to believe that "the more successful partner
should not have to participate in household labor. It was a form of 'extra
credit' if the more successful partner did housework., 97 More generally,
findings show that "[w]hen differences in proportional contributions to
housework occur in same-sex couples, the partner with less job prestige,
less income, or greater job flexibility tends to perform a greater
proportion of unpaid work., 98 Approaching the question from the other
side, studies have found sharing of household labor in same-sex couples
to be "most common among affluent couples who relied on paid help,
and when both partners had less demanding jobs with more flexible
schedules." 99
Children, moreover, complicate the division of labor in a household.
Parenting in different-sex couples is a strong driver of labor
specialization and the gendering of carework. This also holds true for
different-sex couples raising children, a demographic that is swiftly
increasing. A sizeable number of same-sex couples are raising or will
raise children as adoption laws, reproductive technologies, and social
92. Goldberg, supra note 87, at 89.
93. Peplau & Fingerhut, supra note 90, at 408.
94. Id. at 409.
95. Id.; see also Becker, supra note 78.
96. Patterson, supra note 88, at 661.
97. Sutphin, supra note 89, at 196.
98. Goldberg, supra note 87, at 88 (citations omitted).
99. Peplau & Fingerhut, supra note 90, at 408.
2015] 1269
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
norms shift.100 An estimated thirty-four percent of lesbian couples and
twenty-two percent of gay male couples living together are already
raising children, according to census data. 101 As the number of children
living in same-sex households increases, so will the number of same-sex
couples who must "master new tasks, cope with new demands on their
time, and deal with role transitions of various kinds."'10 2
Already, Martha Ertman notes, "[o]ne in three gay male couples
raising kids have one parent at home full-time, the same rate as straight
couples with kids. Lesbians lag behind with one in four having one
parent engaged in full-time homemaking."'10 3 Another study from 2011
found that the majority of a sample group of lesbian parents "divided
paid labor unequally (e.g., one partner worked full-time and one partner
worked part-time), which often led to inequalities in the division of
unpaid labor.' 0 4 Increasingly, then, "among the gay and lesbian couples
that have children, rates of stark specialization ... are comparable to the
rates among heterosexual parents."' 0 5 Qualitative data likewise indicates
the possibility of strong gendering being reinscribed through parenting.
One study subject, a gay father raising two adoptive children with his
partner, remarked:
[I'm] in charge of the childcare, I'm the mom basically. I have
definitely taken on the role of the mother at home ... in some
ways we kind of entered into the situation with that
understanding... he even said before we had kids like, "well
you have to be the mommy" kind of thing, like, he didn't want
to be, he wanted me to be the nurturer. 0 6
As Ramona Oswald has stated: "[B]eing lesbian or gay is not in itself
100. In 2010, approximately 16,000 same-sex couples had an adopted child, reflecting a
significant increase from 2000, when 6477 same-sex couples had adopted children. GARY J. GATES,
WILLIAMS INST., LGBT PARENTING IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2013), available at
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf. Same-sex couples
are six times more likely than their different-sex counterparts to be raising foster children. Id.
Overall, more than 125,000 same-sex couple households, almost twenty percent of all same-sex
couple households, include nearly 220,000 children under the age of eighteen. Id. at 2-3.
101. Peplau & Fingerhut, supra note 90, at 414.
102. Patterson, supra note 88, at 666.
103. ERTMAN, supra note 68, at 128. The fact that lesbians tend to specialize labor less may
suggest a greater commitment to relationship equality.
104. Goldberg, supra note 87, at 89.
105. Martha Ertman, Marital Contracting in a Post-Windsor World, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
479, 506 (2014).
106. Ramona Faith Oswald et al., Queering "The Family," in HANDBOOK OF FEMINIST
FAMILY STUDIES 43, 45 (2009) (alterations in original).
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enough to transcend heteronormativity."' 10 7
As with different-sex couples, there are a number of factors that
produce and maintain power as well as gender in a same-sex marriage.
Nan Hunter includes among the factors: "the presence of children, the
power dynamics related to being the sole biological parent in a couple,
income differences between partners, the length of the relationship,
women's experience of and commitment to employment outside the
home, and the strength of individual desire to conform to gender
expectations. 10 8 Furthermore, the way that same-sex couples navigate
the household economy should not be automatically "mapped onto the
heterosexual 'template,' in which economic providing and domestic
activities are presumed to have identical meanings and dynamics as in
heterosexual couples. 109
Nevertheless, the reality is that both earnings and gender have a
tenacious hold on intimate ordering in marriage because of the ways in
which couples create marital bargains and differentially value individual
contributions. Same-sex couples make the same type of marital bargains
that different-sex couples do. Same-sex spouses bargain over who will
do what housework, in other words, the routine chores that comprise the
maintenance of a household and a shared life. Likewise, same-sex
spouses experience the same spectrum of economic bargaining positions:
Some individuals make career sacrifices so that their partners can take
on new responsibilities, some experience periods of economic
dependency while obtaining education or while job searching, and yet
others take on the role of provider either by inclination or for practical
reasons.
One key point of traction in sociological findings is that "unequal
incomes within a couple make it 'incredibly difficult to resist those
patterns of dominance' that cohere around the role and status afforded
the higher earner."'10 Unequal incomes correlate with (and potentially
produce) labor specialization and have traditionally been a hallmark of
marriage as well as gender definition within the household. A second
key idea is that marriage encourages spouses to specialize labor by
107. Id. I leave to the side in this paper the question of whether the hetemormative frame is
normatively problematic for same-sex relationships and whether same-sex couples should be
pushing against this frame. Instead, I focus on how to change divorce rules to accommodate both
same-sex and different-sex couples who are regulated by rules that encourage sharing and labor
specialization on entry and then penalize this behavior upon exit.
108. Hunter, supra note 86, at 1866.
109. Goldberg, supra note 87, at 92-93.
110. Leckey, supra note 88, at 182 (citations omitted).
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holding out the legal promise of financial protection if divorce occurs.
For this reason, presumably, studies reveal that different-sex cohabiting
partners specialize labor at a much lower rate than different-sex married
partners: "[M]arried couples are noticeably different from all other
household types," and the "division of household labor is ... more
egalitarian in different sex cohabiting couples than in different-sex
married couples." ' Consequently, it is possible that same-sex marriage
will not transform marriage; rather, marriage may transform same-sex
couples. 112 If same-sex couples assign and perform household work
according to either financial earnings or conventional gender lines,
gender stereotypes will continue to inscribe themselves in marriage. If
courts persistently fail to capture unpaid contributions when dividing
marital property, gender will likewise continue to inhere in marriage, to
the detriment of the feminized party upon divorce. Equitable distribution
rules must evolve to better reflect marital bargains, capturing specialized
labor and economic partnership in particular, thereby increasing the
potential to rewrite gender norms in marriage for everyone.
II. LEARNING TO DIVIDE THE DOMESTIC DOLLAR
Equitable distribution statutes have the potential to redress gendered
imbalances in both same- and different-sex marriages caused by unequal
division of household labor and market participation during marriage. To
achieve this goal, courts have construed the category of marital property
expansively. For example, the Maryland Supreme Court has stated: "Our
cases have generally construed the word 'property' broadly, defining it
as a term of wide and comprehensive signification embracing everything
which has exchangeable value or goes to make up a man's wealth-
every interest or estate which the law regards of sufficient value for
judicial recognition. ' 1 3 While the trend among courts has indeed been to
include an increasing number of assets within the marital estate, the
problem of career assets-in particular, one spouse's contributions to
another's career-continues to hamper the success of these statutes.
In this Part, I discuss the continued exemption of certain career assets
from inclusion in the marital estate or, if included, from the presumption
11. Hunter, supra note 86, at 1866.
112. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldberg, Why Marriage, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS
(Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth Scott eds., 2012); Ettelbrick, supra note 3, at 1; see also Polikoff,
supra note 3, at 1546 ("[A]n effort to legalize lesbian and gay marriage would make a public
critique of the institution of marriage impossible.").
113. Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079 (Md. 1985) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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of equal division. I begin by describing the ways in which courts fail to
properly compensate spousal contributions made by a non- or low-
earning spouse to the high-earning spouse's career success. I discuss
why courts have exempted these assets from the marital estate and from
equal division. As compensatory mechanisms, courts have used
distribution and support. I argue, however, that both of these strategies
are inadequate as well as theoretically misguided. I ultimately evaluate
judicial models for transforming career assets into marital property that
is subject to equal division, and propose further modifications to divorce
rules.
A. Questioning the Career Asset Carve-Outs
Lenore Weitzman, in The Divorce Revolution, defined career assets as
"tangible and intangible assets that are acquired as a part of either
spouse's career or career potential .... [These assets include] pension
and retirement benefits, a license to practice a profession or trade,
medical and hospital insurance, the goodwill of a business, and
entitlements to company goods and services."'1 14 Career assets are key
marital assets because, for the majority of divorcing couples, whether
same- or different-sex, these assets are a primary source of wealth. 1 5
Professional training, advanced education, and earning capacity are
extremely valuable "in our modem, knowledge-based
economy ... [where] human capital is the most important form of
wealth produced during most marriages."'1 16 The failure to include
enhanced earning capacity in the marital estate means therefore that, in
different-sex marriages, "most wives are cut off from property rights in
the key family asset-the wage of the ideal worker,"'1 17 and "women's
per capita income and standard of living tend to decline substantially
following divorce while those of men tend to increase."' 1 8 The problem,
however, is not limited to women because it is, at root, one of gender
and earning power. The failure of courts to capture unpaid spousal
contributions will also impact men in different-sex marriages who
choose the role of "wife," just as it will affect any same-sex couples who
114. WEITZMAN, supra note 24, at 110.
115. In the majority of divorces, there is little property to divide. Couples likely own a home
and participate in a pension plan; in fact, they are more likely to own debt than assets at the
termination of a marriage. Garrison, supra note 11, at 667.
116. Singer, supra note 59; see also Kelly, supra note 12, at 163-65.
117. Williams, supra note 6, at 2236.
118. Garrison, supra note 11, at 633. In addition, contrary to the stated goals of equitable
distribution, the burden falls the hardest on women exiting long-term marriages. Id. at 739.
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choose to specialize in household labor.
1. The Last Citadel: Professional Degrees and Family Businesses
Courts have included career assets as marital property gradually and
in piecemeal fashion. Despite valuation difficulties, states now include
pensions as part of the marital estate. Courts may also include patents
and some other illiquid future income streams. 1 9 Courts generally
include professional or "enterprise" goodwill in marital property,
although there are some holdout states that refuse to do so.120 Courts
have, however, routinely refused to characterize professional degrees
and enhanced earning capacity as marital property. In addition, courts
have persistently undervalued the contribution of non-owning spouses to
increases in value to family businesses and other corporate shares. These
assets and contributions remain problematic carve-outs to the
presumption (or mandate) of equal division of marital property.
Professional Degrees. The conventional and even clich6 story of
professional degrees and enhanced earning capacity is a familiar one.
Wives take any available job in order to scrape together money to pay
for household and sometimes even tuition for the husband while he is in
school. Then, when the husband finishes school and embarks on a new
career, he leaves the wife. The West Virginia Supreme Court described
the typical situation in Hoak v. Hoak12 1: "The supporting
spouse... made personal financial sacrifices and consented to a lower
standard of living than she would have enjoyed had her husband been
employed. She postponed her own career plans and presumably
overlooked many current needs for the prospect of future material
benefits. '2 While this narrative may sound dated to some, educational
attainment and professional degrees remain valuable assets as the
119. See Majauskas v. Majauskas, 463 N.E.2d 15, 17 (N.Y. 1984).
120. Professional goodwill, like a professional degree, is a career asset that courts have
debated extensively because it contains elements of personal achievement. With goodwill, however,
courts have found a way to differentiate between personal and enterprise goodwill and generally
have been willing to allow professional goodwill to be characterized as marital property. In a survey
of jurisdictions discussed in May v. May, 589 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 2003), the West Virginia Court
found that thirteen courts made no distinction between personal and enterprise goodwill, counting
them both in calculations of marital property and dividing them. Five courts counted neither as
marital property. Constituting the plurality, twenty-four states differentiated between enterprise and
personal goodwill, and counted enterprise goodwill as marital property. See id at 543.
121. 370 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1988)
122. Id. at 477 ("The appellant's sacrifices would have been rewarded had the marriage
endured. The divorce has left Rebecca Hoak at a substantial disadvantage when compared with her
ex-husband.").
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workplace evolves and the needs of the labor market change. Advanced
education has become almost a requirement in some areas for career
advancement, and many couples agree that they will jointly make
sacrifices at some point in their marriage to further the education of one
partner. Accordingly, the legal questions persist even though gender
roles are evolving and two earner families are more the norm than at any
time in the past. Despite the importance and ubiquity of educational
attainment, courts almost uniformly refuse to count professional degrees
or any enhanced earning capacity as marital property. As Hanoch Dagan
and Carolyn Frantz observe: "Perhaps the most common objection to
division of earning capacity on divorce is that it is not property."1 23 In a
statement typical of courts around the country, the Colorado Supreme
Court set forth this common objection:
An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of
previous education, combined with diligence and hard work. It
may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of money. It is
simply an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in
the future acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the
attributes of property in the usual sense of that term. 124
Courts focus on the need for property to be heritable or at least
marketable-to conform to a classic model of property ownership.
Nonetheless, as Joan Williams has observed: "Many modem property
rights also clash with a model of absolute, alienable, inheritable, and
exchangeable entitlements. Examples are pensions and goodwill which
are widely recognized as property despite their lack of heritability."'' 25
Other forms of property, from life estates to partnership rights, are
likewise inalienable yet recognized as property. What courts do not
recognize is that "future earning capacity is not just a personal attribute:
It is an income-generating asset ... capable of treatment as property."'' 26
Moreover, "engaging in an essentialist inquiry into the nature of
123. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 109; see also Williams, supra note 6, at 2268
("Courts, with few exceptions, have rejected wives' claims that the degrees are marital property,
often using broad language to the effect that human capital does not have the attributes traditionally
associated with property.").
124. In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 679 (Colo. 1987) (citing In re Marriage of
Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978)). "While pension rights, as in Deering, constitute a current
asset which the individual has a contractual fight to receive, such rights are plainly
distinguishable from a mere expectancy of future enhanced income resulting from a professional
degree. The latter is but an intellectual attainment; it is not a present property interest." Archer v.
Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079-80 (Md. 1985).
125. See Williams, supra note 6, at 2271.
126. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 109.
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property simply masks the inherent normative choices" to reward
earning and devalue unpaid, underpaid, and household labor.127
Another persistent argument against making a degree or enhanced
earning capacity marital property is that the valuation of these assets is
too difficult and speculative. The Maryland Supreme Court, refusing to
characterize a professional degree as marital property, stated: "At best, it
represents a potential for increase in a person's earning capacity made
possible by the degree and license in combination with innumerable
other factors and conditions too uncertain and speculative to constitute'marital property' within the contemplation of the legislature.' 128 These
arguments confuse property characterization with property valuation.
That is to say, difficulties that arise in valuing a professional degree
should not drive the characterization of the degree, but rather should be
taken up in the valuation stage of property division. Furthermore, even
acknowledging that valuation for degrees is complicated, it is clear that
courts have methods and options at their disposal. Courts routinely find
the value of other future income streams, such as pensions. Furthermore,
courts have adopted an "if and when" approach in the valuation of
patents, a method that might be particularly apt for degrees because of
the speculative and variable nature of future income.
Finally, one of the most resonant sets of arguments derives from the
notion of personal merit. Courts, guided by culturally entrenched notions
of individual accomplishment, are reticent to attribute the professional
achievements of one spouse to the partnership unit. 129 Success in the
professional world is perceived as "a constitutive component of the
individual self ' 130 and the normative argument against it "arise[s] from
autonomy."' 31 In addition, approaching the question from an autonomy
standpoint, critics have argued that making these career assets part of the
marital estate would consign the earner to a specific job and salary level,
127. Id.
128. Archer, 493 A.2d at 1080; see also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J.
1982) ("Valuing a professional degree in the hands of any particular individual at the start of his
or her career would involve a gamut of calculations that reduces to little more than guesswork.").
129. Regan, supra note 47, at 2355 ("The resulting visceral sense that the husband's income
is property earned by the sweat of his brow thus may lead a court to regard a claim on post-divorce
income as a request for redistribution of property from one who has labored in the market to one
who has not.").
130. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 109. This derived from a Lockean notion of labor and
property. See Regan, supra note 47, at 2350 ("Labor desert theory, the idea that property rights are
justified as a reward for the expenditure of one's labor, is perhaps 'the principal normative theory of
property."').
131. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 109.
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thereby removing the option for career changes that reduced the earner's
income. Even feminist critics note that we should be "wary of the idea
that one person could have an ownership interest in the person of
another. Indeed, the history of marriage law itself cautions against giving
spouses property interests in each other's person."'1 2 For all these
reasons, courts have refused to count professional degrees as marital
property.
Family Businesses. Under the right conditions, an increase in value to
a family business or other corporate shares is marital property. If the
business shares were acquired during marriage, then they are generally
always characterized as marital property. The problem then becomes not
how to characterize the property but rather what percentage of the
property to award to the contributing (non-owner) spouse. Even if the
shares were acquired by one party before the marriage, and would
therefore generally count as separate property, any increase to the shares
produced through a couple's joint labor is considered marital property.
What courts require is a nexus between the increase in value and the
contributions of a spouse, 13 and if the court fails to find the nexus,
appreciation is deemed to be passive and the asset remains separate
property. The concept underlying this conversion of separate property
into marital property is that one spouse should not be unjustly enriched
by the contributions of the other.
When spouses directly contribute and the value that they add to a joint
enterprise is measurable-when, for instance, a spouse is an employee of
the company and works directly for the benefit of the company-courts
routinely award a percentage of the increase in value to the non-owning
spouse. Even if the spousal contribution is indirect, however, courts are
supposed to take spousal contributions into account. A New York court
stated in Brennan v. Brennan1 34 :
[M]arriage is an economic partnership, the success of which is
dependent not only upon the respective financial contributions
of the partners, but also on a wide range of nonremunerated
services to the joint enterprise, such as homemaking, raising
children and providing the emotional and moral support
132. Singer, supra note 58, at 124.
133. Professional goodwill is treated similarly, in that it is generally characterized as marital
property, subject to equitable division, and courts look for a nexus or demonstration of spousal
contribution in order to determine the correct division. See, e.g., Gaskill v. Robbins, 282 S.W.3d
306 (Ky. 2009) (requiring trial court to differentiate between personal and enterprise goodwill in
valuing wife's oral surgery practice).
134. 479 N.Y.S.2d 877 (App. Div. 1984).
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necessary to sustain the other spouse in coping with the
vicissitudes of life outside the home. 135
In this way, courts have understood that the equitable distribution
statutes are meant to capture the unpaid labor produced by the non-
earning spouse.
Accordingly, in Brennan, a case about what percentage of a
husband's dairy farm would go to the wife at the time of the divorce, the
trial court was obliged to calculate what percentage of the increase in
value to the dairy farm was attributable to the wife, in order to make the
property award. The court observed that "[p]rosperity and growth" in the
dairy business occurred during the marriage, in no small part because the
wife "pledged her personal credit for its debts and contributed indirectly
to its success through her services as a homemaker and mother." 136 Not
including the increase in value in the marital estate, the court stated,
would "violate the letter and spirit of the Equitable Distribution Law."1 37
Following Brennan, in Price v. Price,'38 a 1986 case about the
appreciated value of one spouse's stove business, 139 the court reiterated
that an increase in company value was marital property even if one
partner's contributions were indirect, further concluding that there was
no requirement for a contributing spouse to prove a causal link between
contribution and increase in value. 140
Despite these precedent-setting cases, courts have nevertheless
created a presumption against equal division in these cases. 141 In
Arvantides v. Arvantides,142 a New York case decided one year after
Brennan, the appellate court remarked: "Although plaintiffs
contributions as a homemaker are indeed worthy of full
135. Id. at 880.
136. Id. at 880-81. The husband was entitled to credit for the "value of his initial capital
contribution to the spousal enterprise consisting of his premarital cattle and equipment." Id. at 881.
137. Id.
138. 503 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y. 1986).
139. At stake was the increase in value to defendant's ownership interest in the Unity Stove
Company (Unity), a family business engaged in the wholesale supply of kitchen parts and
appliances. Id. at 685.
140. Id. at 687.
141. Legal procedure also places the contributing spouse at a distinct disadvantage since, in
most states, the non-eaming spouse bears the burden of proving her contributions. The task of
proving an increase in value is difficult when valuation methods conflict. In addition, the
contributing spouse may not have access to all the documentary evidence-held by the other
spouse-needed in order to prove the increase. Proving contributions may be similarly difficult,
especially when the contributions are indirect and consist of the daily work of maintaining a home
and family.
142. 478 N.E.2d 199 (N.Y. 1985).
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consideration ... there is no requirement that the distribution of each
item of marital property be on an equal or 50-50 basis.', 143 The court
thereafter reduced the wife's award in her husband's dental practice
from fifty to twenty-five percent, citing the "modest nature"' 44 of her
contributions without actually discussing what the wife's contributions
were. In Capasso v. Capasso,145 several years later, a New York court
awarded the wife only twenty percent of the two million dollar increase
in value to the construction business started and run by the husband. 146
The court awarded this low percentage despite the fact that the wife had
"immersed herself in [the business], dedicating herself to and identifying
with the husband's success.' 47 She had "contributed directly and
significantly to [the company's] success" 1 48 by making room for the
business operations office in their home, doing paperwork and
"legwork' ' 149 for the company, and routinely discussing "business
matters"' 150 with her husband. She consulted with the accountant
regarding company business and she regularly entertained her husband's
customers and colleagues. She also raised the children and managed the
housework, freeing her husband's time for his business. The husband,
for his part, contended only that his wife's services were not"extraordinary," "unusual," or "significant."15'
This trend to downplay spousal contributions, both direct and indirect,
to the increase in value of a family business has continued almost
without interruption.'52 In 2013, in Mississippi, an appellate court
affirmed the Chancellor's ruling that interest in two grocery stores
owned by a husband was separate property because "any contribution to
these two grocery stores by [the wife] was minimal at best, and there
was no increase in value during the marriage that was attributable to [the
143. Id. at 200 (internal citations omitted).
144. Id.
145. 517 N.Y.S.2d 952 (App. Div. 1987).
146. Id. at 963.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. For similar results with reversed gendering, see Teitler v. Teitler, 549 N.Y.S.2d 13,
14 (App. Div. 1989). The court awarded the wife seventy-five percent of the increase in value to her
art business because "her efforts were considerably more instrumental in its operation and success
than were the administrative and sales services performed by plaintiff, who was eventually replaced
by a part-time employee." Id.
152. For the exception to this rule, see the discussion of Sykes v. Sykes, infra Part II.B.2.
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wife]."' 53 Although the wife had worked occasionally in the floral
department at one of the stores, the court discounted this involvement
and failed to even mention her work within the home. 5 4
These types of work patterns and spousal contributions also define
some same-sex households and will, in the absence of rule reform, cause
similar inequities. An important recent cohabitant property rights case in
Illinois, Blumenthal v. Brewer, 55 provides a preview of the problems of
one spouse contributing to the other's business success and the wealth
imbalances caused by the specialization of labor in a same-sex
household. In that case, two women had been in a marital-like
relationship for twenty-six years before the relationship dissolved. The
two women met at graduate school, "exchanged rings as symbols of their
lifelong commitment to each other,"'15 6 and presented themselves to their
families and friends as a committed couple. One woman-Brewer-
obtained a law degree, the other-Blumenthal-a medical degree. The
couple had three biological children through Assisted Reproductive
Technology and the couple deliberately allocated "work and family"
responsibilities such that the lawyer "stayed home for a while as the
children's primary caregiver and then pursued employment in the public
sector where she had regular work hours and no travel requirements.' '1 57
The lawyer, as the stay-at-home parent, took care of all household
management chores and "[t]his arrangement enabled [the doctor] to
devote time to her medical career and become the family's primary
breadwinner."15
When the relationship ended, Blumenthal requested partition of the
house that the couple owned jointly. Brewer filed a counterclaim,
requesting "to receive sole title to the property so that the couple's
overall assets would be equalized after she stayed at home with the
couple's three children while Blumenthal was the family's
breadwinner."'159 More specifically, Brewer requested that a constructive
trust be imposed over the residence "to prevent unjust enrichment arising
153. Larson v. Larson, 122 So. 3d 1213, 1216 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
154. Id. Justifying the decision to characterize the property as separate, the court concluded:
"[The wife] did not actively participate in the business, did not participate in business decisions, and
did not invest or contribute money to its ongoing operations." Id.
155. 24 N.E.3d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014), appeal allowed, 31 N.E.3d 767 (Il1. 2015).
156. Id. at 170.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 169.
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from Blumenthal's greater net worth at the end of the relationship."'160
Speaking to the question of net worth, the court remarked "due to the
disproportionate time and attention that Blumenthal was able to give to
her career during the relationship, Blumenthal has not only a valuable
medical practice, but also more income and savings than Brewer."' 16 1
The court acknowledged, then, that Blumenthal's superior financial
position at the dissolution of the relationship was created through not
only Blumenthal's labor but also Brewer's contributions. While property
distribution was not the claim before the court, 162 a look at the couple's
assets makes clear that Blumenthal's medical practice-and any increase
in its value during the time of the couple's relationship-would form a
key part of the marital estate. Speculating as to what property division
under equitable distribution would look like, Brewer would be entitled to
a percentage of the increase in value to Blumenthal's practice and
Blumenthal's professional goodwill could also be valued and equitably
distributed. Extrapolating from precedent, however, Brewer would
receive only a small percentage of the increase in value to Blumenthal's
practice and her indirect contributions to the practice would not likely be
properly compensated. The relationship between Brewer and Blumenthal
gives us a preview, then, of how specialized labor will remain
problematic for all couples until indirect contributions-mainly
housework and carework-are counted as full participation in
marriage. 163 Moreover, their relationship and its dissolution reveal how
persistent the problem of gender will be in the absence of reform.
2. Distribution and Support as Compensatory Mechanisms
Courts prefer to use distribution and support, rather than
reconstruction and expansion of the marital estate, as compensatory
160. Id. at 172.
161. Id.
162. The legal question before the court was whether Brewer could continue with her claim,
given the strong precedent of Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (111. 1979) (ruling against division
of cohabitant assets on public policy grounds).
163. For a similar case, see Londergan v. Carrillo, No. 08-P- 1699, 2009 WL 2163186 (Mass.
App. Ct. July 22, 2009). Londergan was the primary caretaker of the couple's children and had been
the stay-at-home mother, while Carrillo "assumed the role as breadwinner and worked demanding
hours as a surgeon." Id. at * 1. This agreement to specialize labor resulted in significant income
disparity. The trial court judge "determined that Carrillo's gross income as an orthopedic
surgeon.., was an estimated $201,856 .... Londergan, although trained as a lawyer, had a gross
income of $37,960." Id. Londergan received a two-year award of rehabilitative alimony. Id.
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mechanisms.164 All equitable distribution states set forth a list of factors
for courts to consider in distributing marital property, and permit courts
great discretion in deciding how to weigh the various factors. Most states
factor in the contributions made by each party to the marital wealth of
the couple. 165 North Carolina, for example, specifies that courts shall
consider "[a]ny equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect
contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the
party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and
contributions and services, or lack thereof, as a spouse, parent, wage
earner or homemaker" as well as "[a]ny direct or indirect contribution
made by one spouse to help educate or develop the career potential of
the other spouse.' 66 Moreover, equitable distribution statutes uniformly
allow courts the discretion to consider "[a]ny other factor which the
court finds to be just and proper."'167
Using distribution, however, has its drawbacks. One drawback is that,
in the context of professional degrees, if one spouse has enjoyed
enhanced income flowing from the other's degree for a number of years,
the court takes this into consideration and generally disallows or
discounts any discretionary compensation. 168 Another problem is that, in
some states, equitable distribution statutes mandate equal division. Equal
division precludes courts from using discretion to compensate economic
dependents. Even when states do not mandate equal distribution, courts
164. The Colorado Supreme Court observed in In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676 (Colo.
1987), that, in order to avoid unfairness, "[t]he contribution of one spouse to the education of the
other spouse may be taken into consideration when marital property is divided." Id. at 680; see also
Roberts v. Roberts, 670 N.E.2d 72, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ("Therefore, while Indiana does not
permit a degree to be included as marital property, and further will not allow an award of future
earnings unless the spouse qualifies for maintenance, nevertheless the earning ability of the degree-
earning spouse may be considered in determining the distribution of the marital estate.").
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-20 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 8.051 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). Martha Fineman notes that the
factors that courts use can be broken down into four categories: title, fault, need, and contribution.
See FINEMAN, supra note 48, at 41.
166. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-20.
167. Id. § 50-20(c)(12).
168. Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 179-81, 677 P.2d 152, 159 (1984). The
Washburn Court explained:
We point out that where a marriage endures for some time after the professional degree is
obtained, the supporting spouse may already have benefited financially from the student
spouse's increased earning capacity to an extent that would make extra compensation
inappropriate. For example, he or she may have enjoyed a high standard of living for several
years. Or perhaps the professional degree made possible the accumulation of substantial
community assets which may be equitably divided.
Id. at 181, 677 P.2d at 159; see also Nelson v. Nelson, 736 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Alaska 1987).
[Vol. 90:12451282
DIVORCE EQUALITY
are unlikely to deviate from equal division because many distribution
statutes require the court to put in writing its reasons for deviation.
Courts are, in addition, concerned that these decisions are more likely to
be overruled on appeal. A wife's contributions are therefore likely to be
undercompensated in the push for equal division. Accordingly, the
"[f]ormal equal division of marital property does little to resolve the
deeper substantive inequality between men and women."'
' 69
Most courts, however, use maintenance awards rather than
distribution to compensate contributing spouses because the majority of
couples do not have sufficient liquid assets to make distribution matter.
As the Colorado Supreme Court noted: "[Distribution] is effective only
if sufficient marital property has been accumulated by the parties during
their marriage."170 The Alaska Supreme Court, in Nelson v. Nelson,
71
described the classic professional degree dilemma: "Typically, one
spouse attains a degree while the other provides support; then a divorce
occurs soon after graduation. Usually there are few assets immediately
available, but one spouse leaves the marriage with an education and
increased earning potential, while the other spouse is given nothing for
her efforts.' 72 Because of these liquidity problems, courts commonly
conclude that maintenance is the most suitable method for
compensation.173 As with distribution, alimony statutes allow courts to
consider a number of factors in awarding maintenance, including "[t]he
contribution by one spouse to the education, training, or increased
earning power of the other spouse," 174 and "[t]he contribution of a
spouse as homemaker."'1
75
There are, nevertheless, problems with the maintenance approach. To
begin, the low- or non-earner must often pass a needs test in order to
qualify for alimony. In Texas, for example, the party seeking
maintenance must show either that she "is unable to earn sufficient
income to provide for [her] minimum reasonable needs because of an
169. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 121.
170. In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 680 (Colo. 1987).
171. 736 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1987).
172. Id. at 1146.
173. Olar, 747 P.2d at 680 ("The situation in which the dissolution of marriage occurs before
the benefits of the advanced degree can be realized, and where no marital property is accumulated,
requires us to look to another remedy for the inequity that results for the working spouse. Another
option... [is] an award of maintenance as a need is demonstrated."); Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d at
180-81, 677 P.2d at 159 (awarding maintenance and providing equitable factors for adjusting
award).
174. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-16.3A(b)(6) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
175. Id. § 50-16-3A(b)(12).
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incapacitating physical or mental disability"' 176 or that she "has been
married to the other spouse for 10 years or longer and lacks the ability to
earn sufficient income to provide for [her] minimum reasonable
needs.' 77 Not surprisingly, courts have construed "reasonable needs"
very differently, with some courts adopting an extremely narrow reading
of the term such that it means "the minimum requirements to sustain
life. 178 Making even a small salary, therefore, could preclude a spouse
from being eligible for maintenance and, consequently, any
compensatory amount encompassed in the support award.
Even if a spouse is eligible to receive maintenance, courts are not in
agreement regarding the type of alimony that is appropriate. Many
courts do not use permanent or rehabilitative alimony for the purpose of
compensating spousal contributions. 79 Moreover, courts in some states
have refused to award reimbursement alimony, the third kind of alimony
that exists, on the grounds that: "Marriage is not a business arrangement
in which the parties keep track of debits and credits, their accounts to be
settled upon divorce. Rather, as we have said, 'marriage is a shared
enterprise, a joint undertaking... in many ways it is akin to a
partnership."",180 Those courts that do award reimbursement alimony
generally limit the amount of reimbursement to the cost of the
education.181 In Hoak v. Hoak,182 for example, the Court endorsed this
176. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.051(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
177. Id. § 8.051(2)(b). The third provision allows for maintenance if the spouse seeking
maintenance is "the custodian of a child of the marriage of any age who requires substantial care
and personal supervision because of a physical or mental disability that prevents the spouse from
earning sufficient income to provide for the spouse's minimum reasonable needs." Id. § 8.051 (2)(c);
see also Olar, 747 P.2d at 681 ("[A] trial court may use an award of maintenance as a tool to
balance equities and compensate a spouse whose work has enabled the other spouse to obtain an
education; however, this tool is available for use only where the spouse seeking maintenance meets
the statutory threshold requirements of need." (emphasis added) (quoting In re Marriage of McVey,
641 P.2d 300, 301 (Colo. App. 1981))).
178. Olar, 747 P.2d at 681 ("This 'threshold of need' was not defined in McVey, but appears
to have incorporated the concept of the minimum requirements to sustain life.").
179. See In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Iowa 1989) ("The alimony of which
we speak is designed to give the 'supporting' spouse a stake in the 'student' spouse's future earning
capacity, in exchange for recognizable contributions to the source of that income-the student's
advanced education. As such, it is to be clearly distinguished from 'rehabilitative' or 'permanent'
alimony.").
180. Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 181, 677 P.2d 152, 159-60 (1984) (quoting
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (N.J. 1982)).
181. See, e.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758-59 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard v.
Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750-53 (Okla. 1979); Beeler v. Beeler, 715 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1986); Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 475-79 (W. Va. 1988).
182. 370 S.E.2d 473 (W.Va. 1988).
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approach because it avoided complicated questions of valuation: "Unlike
an award based on the value of a professional degree, reimbursement
alimony is based on the actual amount of contributions, and does not
require a judge to guess about future earnings, inflation, the relative
values of the spouses' contributions, etc.' ' 183  This conception of
enhanced earning capacity, narrowing compensation to reimbursement,
fails to capture the workings of the larger marital bargain.
Finally, distribution and maintenance are not only flawed mechanisms
for compensating spousal contributions but also theoretically
inapposite. 184  Using distribution or maintenance to solve the
compensation problem puts the non- or low-earner's award in the realm
of discretionary decision-making and judicial generosity: "[Alimony]
places men's claims to family wealth in the nondiscretionary realm of
entitlement, while women's and children's claims are relegated to the
discretionary realm of family law, where the issue is one of whether
courts will redistribute 'the man's income."",185 A distribution or spousal
support award profoundly fails to reflect the idea of marriage as an
economic partnership in which two individuals share equally in the
financial successes and losses of the unit. Distribution and maintenance,
in this way, fail to capture the normative good of the property
framework, which is to "encourage people to invest, to labor, and to plan
carefully" such that "people will work and trade and make everyone
collectively better off.' ' 86
B. Why and How to Reward Spousal Contributions
The question-understanding that the same problems that have
plagued different-sex couples will continue to burden same-sex
183. Id. at 477-78 (awarding the wife $100,000 as reimbursement alimony, calculating "all
financial contributions towards the former spouse's education, including household expenses,
educational costs, school travel expenses, and any other contributions used by the supported spouse
in obtaining his or her degree or license" (emphasis in original) (quoting Mahoney, 453 A.2d at
535)).
184. Practically speaking, property division also has a number of benefits for the receiver:
There is no tax on a lump sum received as part of property division (while alimony is taxable), there
is no risk of non-payment, and there is no issue of discounted present value. See Mnookin &
Komhauser, supra note 84, at 962.
185. Williams, supra note 6, at 2234. But see Regan, supra note 47, at 2350 ("The suggestion
by some feminists that a property-based model of autonomy and obligation marginalizes many
women's experiences should at least give us pause in relying on property rhetoric to argue that
women should have greater claims on their husbands' post-divorce income.").
186. See Carol M. Rose, Rhetoric and Romance: A Comment on Spouses and Strangers, 82
GEo. L.J. 2409, 2417 (1994).
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couples-is how courts should reflect the notion of economic
partnership and compensate spouses for specialization of labor in marital
property division. The idea of reimbursement, as we have seen in the
alimony context, falls far short of appropriate compensation. Another
approach is to compensate the low-earner for household labor by placing
a market value on this labor at the time of divorce. This approach is also
problematic because of the systemic devaluation of care and domestic
work. Herna Hill Kay argues for approaching "the degree dilemma
through the analysis of the loss incurred by the supporting spouse rather
than attempting to divide the gain realized by the supported student
spouse., 187 Rhode and Minow likewise contend that "spouses should be
entitled to a proportion of each other's past and future earning potential
commensurate with their contribution to the relationship and with the
personal loss in earning potential that it has entailed.' 88 The idea of lost
opportunity or wages is problematic because it presents the same
problems of valuation that plague professional degrees and is
sufficiently speculative to make it an unappealing method of assessment
for courts. Lost opportunity may be, however, the most promising
theoretical grounds for awarding contributing spouses a share of the
earning spouse's income post-divorce.
What is critically important, regardless of the approach,' 89 is that
courts reduce the focus on individual entitlements and base marital
property division on shared accomplishment.190 Sharing, Dagan and
Frantz posit, is the "linchpin of [marital] community" and essential to its
success is the rejection of individual interest: "Sharing requires spouses
to 'infuse[] costs and benefits with an intersubjective character' and to
187. Kay, supra note 9, at 31; see also Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory ofAlimony, 77 CALIF. L.
REV. 1 (1989); Allen M. Parkman, Recognition of Human Capital as Property in Divorce
Settlements, 40 ARK. L. REV. 439 (1987).
188. Rhode & Minow, supra note 47, at 201. Joan Krauskopf also endorses the contribution
theory. See Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection
for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REV. 379 (1980). A significant problem with
the contribution approach is that "there is a risk that the traditional devaluation of domestic labor
will lead to low estimates of the value of those contributions to the acquisition of enhanced earning
power." Regan, supra note 47, at 2355.
189. The three main strategies discussed for compensating female labor at home are strikingly
similar to those evaluated at the turn of the nineteenth century in the context of allowances for
wives. Viviane Zelizer notes that the strategies were "payment (direct exchange); an entitlement
(the right to share); and gift (one person's voluntary bestowal on another)." VRTvANA A. ZELIZER,
THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 42 (1995).
190. Rhode & Minow, supra note 47, at 203.
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reject any 'strict accounting based on individual merit."' 1 9' In other
words, to make equal partnership work, spouses must act daily "with
reference to a collective welfare that powerfully informs the calculation
of individual utility.' ' 192 Key to this shift in perspective is the
understanding that the "[tlhe ideal-worker's salary... reflects the work
of two adults: the ideal-worker's market labor and the marginalized-
caregiver's unpaid labor."' 93 The family income does not only represent
the separate work of two individuals but also the shared work of two
people who have bargained for joint success. Therefore, while "the
husband owns his wage vis a vis his employer, ... this does not
determine whether he owns it vis a vis his family.' 19
4
This approach to marital earnings operates on the premise that the
socio-legal meaning of the high-earner's wage transforms from market
wage to domestic dollar. That is, the wage the husband earns is a market
dollar with respect to the workplace and its purchasing power. However,
in the marital context-in home budgeting, on tax returns, and at
divorce-that dollar is a domestic one, to be shared by spouses. Once the
wage is earmarked as domestic dollar, not only does its meaning change,
so does its ownership. 195 A contributing spouse has, from this
perspective, an entitlement to the earning spouse's income as during the
intact marriage. Post-divorce, the contributing spouse has a property
claim to some amount of future income based on both contributions that
were never properly compensated as well as lost opportunity.
Alternately, the contributing spouse has a property claim if we believe
that marriage rules should support a "vision of marriage as an egalitarian
liberal community... [that] accommodates community, autonomy, and
191. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 82-83. This theory can cut both ways; historically
individual accounting was disallowed, and this barred married women from recovering their assets.
See supra notes 69-70 (discussing concept of sharing within relationships).
192. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 147 (1995). But
see Rose, supra note 186, at 2413-15 (pointing out that marital bargains may also be inequitable
and spouses may in fact engage in counting debits and credits even within an intact marriage).
While undoubtedly true, the model of equal partnership is normatively preferable and should be
assumed for purposes of equitable distribution, absent antenuptial agreements to the contrary.
193. Williams, supra note 6, at 2229. This may be akin to Cynthia Starnes' analogy of the
marriage as a partnership and divorce as a buyout. See Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced
Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-
Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993).
194. Williams, supra note 6, at 2229.
195. For a discussion of the domestic dollar and the concept of social earmarking, see
ZELIZER, supra note 189, at 35-70 (1995).
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equality."' 96 In this section, I discuss the ways in which New York
courts have valued spousal contributions, thereby actualizing the notion
of economic partnership.
1. A Proposal to Value Enhanced Earnings
Highlighting the importance of treating enhanced earning capacity as
property, Dagan and Frantz state: "A commitment to the ideal of
marriage as an egalitarian liberal community requires treating spouses'
increased earning capacity as marital property.' 97 They further
underscore the importance of this career asset by observing: "The joint
creation of careers is often one of the most important projects of
marriage. Therefore, excluding earning capacity from the marital estate'makes a mockery of the equal division rule."" g A strong model for
judicial decision-making premised on an egalitarian idea of the domestic
dollar comes from New York. This recognition of the shared ownership
of a domestic dollar is evident in New York's treatment of professional
degrees. New York is the only state to recognize professional degrees as
marital property, and the case that established the rule in 1985, O'Brien
v. O'Brien,199 is instructive. The O'Brien Court began by stating that
professional degrees were capable of being characterized as marital
property because "our statute recognizes that spouses have an equitable
claim to things of value arising out of the marital relationship and
classifies them as subject to distribution by focusing on the marital status
of the parties at the time of acquisition., 200 Marital property, the Court
stated, was a statutory creation "of no meaning whatsoever during the
normal course of a marriage and arises full-grown, like Athena, upon the
signing of a separation agreement or the commencement of a
matrimonial action., 201  That "traditional common law property
concepts" did not align with all forms of marital property, the Court
remarked, was neither surprising nor troubling.0 2
The Court further observed that the legislative history of the statute
confirmed the appropriateness of treating a professional degree as
196. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 133; see also HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE PROPERTY LAW 161-92 (2013).
197. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 107-08.
198. Id. at 108.
199. 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
200. Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
201. Id.
202. Id.
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marital property. "Equitable distribution was based on the premise that a
marriage is, among other things, an economic partnership to which both
parties contribute as spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker. 203 The
Court recounted how Mrs. O'Brien had devoted almost all of the time
during their nine-year marriage to putting her husband through medical
school, working the entire time and "contribut[ing] all of her earnings to
their joint effort., 20 4 At the close of his education, her husband left her
and, had the degree not been counted as marital property, she would
have been left with nothing. The Court therefore allowed the degree to
count as property and remanded the case for a determination of its
value.205
O'Brien provided precedential authority for extending the logic of the
206medical degree as marital property to a law degree, an accounting
degree,20 7 a podiatry practice,208 the licensing and certification of a
physician's assistant,209 a Master's degree in teaching, 2'0  and a
fellowship in the Society of Actuaries. 21' Based on the idea that the
marital estate consists of "things of value" acquired during marriage, a
New York court also extended the ruling to encompass celebrity
status. 212 In Elkus v. Elkus, 21 3 the husband of opera singer Frederica Von
Stade claimed that the celebrity status she gained during their marriage
as an opera singer was due, in large part, to his contributions to her
career. He claimed that this celebrity status was marital property, and the
court agreed.214
In all of these cases, the New York courts put front and center the
203. Id. at 716 (citation omitted).
204. Id.
205. Mrs. O'Brien was subsequently awarded $188,800. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 502 N.Y.S.2d
250, 251 (1986).
206. Cronin v. Cronin, 502 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
207. Vanasco v. Vanasco, 503 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
208. Morton v. Morton, 515 N.Y.S.2d 499 (App. Div. 1987).
209. Morimando v. Morimando, 536 N.Y.S.2d 701 (App. Div. 1988).
210. McGowan v. McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d 990 (App. Div. 1988).
211. McAlpine v. McAlpine, 539 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
212. Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902 (App. Div. 1991) ("Things of value acquired
during marriage are marital property even though they may fall outside the scope of traditional
property concepts." (citations omitted)).
213. 572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (App. Div. 1991).
214. Id. at 903 ("Any attempt to limit marital property to professions which are licensed
would only serve to discriminate against the spouses of those engaged in other areas of
employment. Such a distinction would fail to carry out the premise upon which equitable
distribution is based, i.e., that a marriage is an economic partnership .... ").
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idea of economic partnership. 5 O'Brien introduced the concept of
enhanced earning capacity to describe the income differential that not
only degree attainment but also spousal contributions produce. It is this
combination of professional success and spousal sacrifice that courts
must capture in order to better reflect marital bargains that rely on
specialized labor and unpaid spousal contributions. Consequently,
contributing spouses should have a property right to a portion of the
earning spouse's income not just during marriage but also for a certain
number of years post-divorce in order to equalize their financial
situations and "ameliorate the serious problems gender inequality causes
in the marital relationship., 21 6 The number of years or the dollar amount
that the contributing spouse receives could be measured by the amount
of time and the degree to which the spouses specialized their labor.
Valuation methods such as the "if and when" method could also help
alleviate autonomy concerns with respect to the earning spouse by
allowing for modification of the award due to career change or other
changes in financial circumstances.
Ultimately, the professional degree question is no more than a signal
of the larger question of spousal contributions. As New York courts have
recognized, characterizing professional degrees and celebrity status as
marital property is an imperfect but useful way to capture the value of
these contributions. In order to avoid "property hoarding, ', 217 as Martha
Ertman calls it, courts must recognize enhanced earning capacity as it
exists in multiple forms and patterns in order to capture and compensate
spousal contributions. This will help both different- and same-sex
couples by clarifying the rules around spousal contributions and
recognizing that both education and earning capacity are critical family
assets, rather than individual ones, when couples arrange to specialize
labor.
2. A Case Study: Home Management and Dragon Slaying
New York courts have been leaders in conceptualizing degrees and
status as marital property. They have also established strong precedent
215. Even in New York, however, percentages that courts award are decreasing, and ten
percent is the current standard. See Esposito-Shea v. Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d 793, 797 (App. Div. 2012)
("Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that Supreme Court abused its discretion in limiting the
husband's distributive share of the wife's law degree to 10% of its overall value." (citations
omitted)); Carman v. Carman, 802 N.Y.S.2d 558 (App. Div. 2005); Farrell v. Cleary-Farrell, 761
N.Y.S.2d 357 (App. Div. 2003); Brough v. Brough, 727 N.Y.S.2d 555 (App. Div. 2001).
216. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 122.
217. ERTMAN, supra note 68, at 130.
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for compensating contributing spouses in the context of family business
or corporate assets. While trial courts have decreased awards over the
past few decades, lowering the percentage of the increase in value going
to the contributing spouse, a New York trial court recently reconfirmed
the principles of economic partnership in a case from 2014, Sykes v.
Sykes. 21 8 In that case, one of the major questions confronting the court
was what percentage of value in the husband's business to award the
wife. 219 The husband had started a hedge fund while they were married,
and the two parties stipulated the value of the hedge fund at eight million
dollars at the time of divorce. 220 The wife claimed that she was entitled
to half the value, while the husband claimed she was entitled to no more
221than five percent.
The dispositive question, then, was what contributions the wife had
made to the husband's career success. The court first observed:
"Considering defendant's lack of training or experience in business or
finances in general, let alone in hedge funds or the world of mortgage-
backed securities, she cannot be expected to have been directly involved
in the workings of [the hedge fund]. ''222 Nevertheless, the court stated
that, following cases like Price, nonremunerated services and indirect
contributions were to be considered of value in the equation.
223
Consequently, substantial trial time went toward establishing (or
contesting) the extent of the wife's contributions. The husband "took the
position that even though defendant did not work outside the home and
was very much a 'stay-at-home mom,' her contributions on the domestic
front were ultimately quite limited. 224 He argued that his wife did not
perform housework, did not cook or clean, and did not even perform the
task of "removing the plastic from the dry cleaning."225 The wife, he
argued, "outsourced most domestic chores ' 226 and was reliant on staff to
218. Sykes v. Sykes, No. 313085, 2014 WL 1797010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 2, 2014).
219. Id. at *1.
220. Id. at *4.
221. Id. The court noted from the outset that the presumption in such cases was not one of
equal division. Id. at *4-5 ("Although the law often favors a distribution of marital assets that is as
equal as possible, especially in a marriage of a fairly long duration such as this, it cannot be said that
a fifty-fifty division of a titled spouse's business is the standard irrespective of the contribution by
the non-titled spouse. Contrary to what defendant argues, case law has long confirmed that business
assets are to be treated differently from other assets for purposes of equitable distribution.").
222. Id. at *5.
223. Id.
224. Id. at *7.
225. Id. at *6.
226. Id.
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perform most household chores as well as childcare.227 The husband also
presented evidence that the wife entertained infrequently, and failed
therefore to take on the role of "corporate spouse. 228
The wife, at trial, did not contest her husband's assertions that she
outsourced a great deal of household labor. Nor did she try to establish
that she had been an asset to his business development through her social
efforts and activities. Instead, she testified about the nature and the
specifics of the bargain that the two had agreed upon:
My husband always said that he wanted us-he wanted to be the
one that would be in charge of the money and working, slaying
the dragons on Wall Street; and I would be the one in charge of
the home, the family, our son, anything else. He also said he
liked to keep his home life separate from his work life because
he really wanted space where he relaxed and just would calm
down, because there were so many stresses with his job. And
that was my job, to make sure when he came home he could be
rejuvenated and go back out and slay the dragons on Wall
Street.229
The agreement, according to the wife, provided for a high degree of
specialized household labor and left her in charge of the domestic
sphere.
Evaluating the competing evidence concerning the wife's
contributions to her husband's financial success, the court accorded great
weight to the wife's testimony about the couple's marital bargain.
Referencing their explicit oral agreement to "divide and conquer," the
court stated it was "disingenuous" for the husband to "denigrate" the
value of his wife's role when it was exactly what they had bargained for.
With respect to being a corporate wife, the court remarked that the
husband seldom socialized with colleagues or asked his wife to throw
parties or invite colleagues over for dinner. Addressing the larger
question of the wife's contributions, the court concluded that she had
contributed to her husband's success in context-appropriate ways. The
court observed that social norms prescribed that the wife employ a full
staff, delegate a range of menial chores, and hire full-time help for
230childcare purposes. Referencing household management
responsibilities taken on by women running great estates, the court
remarked:
227. Id. at *6-7.
228. Id. at *5.
229. Id. at *7 (citation omitted).
230. Id. at *6.
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Like a latter-day Cora Crawley, Countess of Grantham, who
unquestionably runs the household at Downton Abbey despite
the presence of Mr. Carson, Mrs. Hughes, Mrs. Patmore and
Daisy, defendant unquestionably ran the Sykes household in
New York, East Hampton and Paris despite the presence of
cooks, personal assistants and the person who unsheathed the
dry cleaning.231
A wife who engaged in neither paid labor nor housework was, the court
stated, a signal of status for the husband. 32
Ultimately, the court awarded the wife thirty percent of the value of
her husband's hedge fund.233 While the judicial result did not yield an
equal division of the husband's interest in the business, it did
intentionally reflect the ideals of economic partnership and value the
contributions of both partners according to the bargain they had struck.
Moreover, rather than discounting unpaid spousal contribution to the
business as "modest 2 34 or passive, the court fully understood that the
wife's active role as both home manager and status symbol added
significant value to the marriage. This reasoning captures what is
critically important-an understanding of both economic partnership and
the shared ownership of the domestic dollar. Applying this judicial logic
to the Blumenthal v. Brewer case, for example, would result in an award
of similar proportions of the value of Blumenthal's medical practice
going to Brewer to compensate her for caretaking and lost opportunity.
Accordingly, this reasoning can, looking forward, provide guidance for
courts in both different- and same-sex divorces because it addresses both
why and how to value spousal contributions, particularly within
conventional marital bargains.
III. ENLARGING THE MARITAL GRID
If which assets to count as marital property is the first challenge that
courts confront in making property distribution more equitable, when to
start counting is the second. The general rule in equitable distribution is
that courts characterize as marital property only those assets that the
231. Id. at *7.
232. Id. One of the highest forms of conspicuous consumption for a household is to have a
highly educated wife and mother who does not work outside the home. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN,
THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (2007). For a more light-hearted take, see WEDNESDAY
MARTIN, PRIMATES OF PARK AVENUE: A MEMOIR (2015).
233. Sykes, 2014 WL 1797010, at *8.
234. See Arvantides v. Arvantides, 478 N.E.2d 199, 199-200 (N.Y. 1985).
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couple acquired during the span of the marriage.235 Therefore, even if a
couple has lived together for ten or twenty years before deciding to
marry, the assets acquired before the marriage do not form part of the
marital estate. The problem is that economic partnership is rarely
perfectly coextensive with marriage. A New York court framed the
problem this way:
Does the "confidential relationship" suddenly blossom at the
time of the posing of the age-old question: "Will you marry
me?" When does the romantic relationship become transformed
into a confidential or fiduciary relationship?... Attempting to
pinpoint the exact time when the "fiduciary relationship"
emerged will plunge the court into the hearts of both parties and
ask this court to determine the exact degree of emotional
236attachment between two persons.
Trying to pinpoint the precise moment that an economic partnership
begins is a difficult proposition. However, in order to fully incorporate
the concept of marriage as an economic partnership in rules governing
divorce, courts will have to enlarge the marital grid and look beyond
traditional rules around timing. In addition, with the first wave of same-
sex divorces appearing on their dockets, property questions raised by
"hybrid" relationships-in which couples have cohabited for significant
amounts of time and built a shared life together before marrying once
they were legally able-will be particularly pressing.
In this Part, I discuss ways that courts have, in the past, avoided
privileging the moment of marriage as the only indicator of a serious
economic partnership between intimates. First, I discuss the concept of"pre-marital" property and how it can provide a blueprint for courts
addressing claims relating to particular assets, such as the family home.
Subsequently, I analyze the question of when to begin measuring or
counting more generally, in cases that are not asset specific. For
example, I examine how a court should define the durational measure of
a relationship for the purposes of defining the marital estate or awarding
maintenance. I propose that courts rely on legal markers and signals of
legal intent, for reasons of both autonomy and efficiency, to determine
when a partnership begins.
235. Any other assets belonging to individuals are considered to be separate property and not
subject to division. The categories of marital and separate property are statutorily defined, as are
typical exceptions such as gifts or bequests received during marriage. See, e.g., 23 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 3501 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
236. McKeown v. Frederick, No. 12/5055, 2013 WL 3068697, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18,
2013).
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A. Transforming Non-Marital into Pre-Marital Property
Couples cohabit before marrying for various reasons-they want a
"test period" before marriage, they are planning to marry but are saving
money first, they want to take advantage of the economic benefit of two
people living together but are not ready to marry. At this particular
historical moment, same-sex couples have cohabited rather than married
in many cases not because of personal preference but rather on account
of legal prohibition. In the case of different-sex cohabitants, the couples
may decide sooner or later to marry; in the case of same-sex cohabitants,
waves of couples are marrying as they obtain the legal right to do so. If
and when any one of these long-term cohabiting couples divorce, courts
will be faced with the property claims produced by "hybrid"
relationships in which the couple has both cohabited, living as if
married, and then subsequently married.
These "hybrid" divorces will be the most difficult for courts to
assess-and risk the most unfair results-when couples, for one reason
or another, have placed most assets and property in the name of one
partner or when the parties have specialized labor before marriage. In
these cases, to not count property acquired during the cohabitation
period at the moment of distribution has the potential to create great
economic harm and hardship for the low earner or non-title-holder. The
courts are not, however, without guidance. Relevant examples exist with
cases involving different-sex hybrid marriages, which demonstrate how
courts can produce equitable results. In this section, I discuss legal
strategies that courts have used in order to evaluate hybrid relationships
and grant rights to cohabiting partners who subsequently marry.
Furthermore, I analyze why it is preferable for courts to enlarge marital
estates and create property subject to equitable distribution rather than
deploy equitable remedies, which is the traditional judicial approach to
cohabitant property claims.
1. Recognizing Relationships on the Marital Fringe
Because most legal rights and responsibilities in a romantic
relationship begin at the moment of marriage, courts often do not assess
premarital moments of commitment and partnership. Nevertheless,
myriad markers of commitment to a romantic and economic partnership
have always existed-the moment of engagement being the most
historically salient. Historically, women obtained a circumscribed set of
rights at the moment of engagement, and could bring legal claims
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against their fiancds for things such as breach of promise.237 Even in the
modem context, courts have used engagement as a privileged moment in
claims concerning the measuring of a marital estate. These cases provide
precedent for courts to rule that equitable division of property should
encompass certain "pre-marital" property pursuant to the economic
partnership theory.238
A set of New Jersey cases is particularly instructive. In 1985, Coney
v. Cone turned on the question of whether a wife, who held sole title
to the marital residence that was purchased when the couple was
unmarried, could exempt the property from equitable distribution.240 At
the time of divorce, the couple had lived together for seventeen years
and been married for only seven of those years. The wife argued that the
house was separate property and that her husband's reimbursement
should be limited to mortgage pay-down. The court disagreed.
In analyzing the claim, the court suggested that three categories of
property existed: non-marital property, cohabitation property, and pre-
marital property. 241 Non-marital property was property that "the party
seeking equitable distribution had nothing to do with prior to the
marriage, either by way of funds or services. 242 The court defined
cohabitation property as "that which arises out of cohabitation of the
parties, not followed by a marriage, 243 and proposed that equitable
237. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 34 (1985); Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2012).
238. In situations where the trajectory of cohabitation leading to marriage is reversed (i.e.,
cohabitation occurs after divorce), courts have also been amenable to providing remedy for
economic dependents. See Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 875 (Miss. 1986) (allowing for
equitable distribution of post-marital property, stating "our law authorizes and sanctions an
equitable division of property accumulated by two persons as a result of their joint efforts. This
would be the case were a common law business partnership breaking up"). The Court added that the
assets subject to distribution were "by no means limited to a consideration of the earnings of the
parties and cash contributions made by each to the accumulation of the properties." Id. at 876. The
Court continued: "As any freshman economics student knows, services and in kind contributions
have an economic value .... Where, as here, the man accepted the benefit of such services, he will
not be heard to argue that he did not need them and that their economic value should not be
considered as the woman's economic contributions to the joint accumulation of property between
them." Id.
239. 503 A.2d 912 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
240. Id. at 914. ("By the time of settlement, defendant had already obtained a divorce from
her former spouse, but plaintiff's action was still pending. Therefore, title was taken in defendant's
name alone, and she executed a mortgage for $16,000 to complete the settlement.").
241. Id at 916-18.
242. Id at 916.
243. 1d.
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remedies were appropriate in these cases. The third category, pre-marital
property, "occurs where one or both marital parties acquired either
personal or real property jointly and made contribution to the same
before marriage.",244 The court pointed out that "[t]his theory rests on the
proposition that property so acquired was in 'contemplation of marriage'
and therefore subject to equitable distribution., 245 Accordingly, the court
concluded that, because the "parties acquired the property specifically
for family purposes" and both made "substantial contributions thereto,"
the value of the property was to be equally divided.246
Three years later, Weiss v. Weiss 24 7 turned on the same question of
whether a home, purchased by an engaged couple before marriage, was
exempt from equitable distribution because only one party held title to
the house.248 The court concluded, referencing Coney: "[W]e believe that
for the purpose of triggering a right of equitable distribution a marital
partnership may be found to have commenced prior to the marriage
ceremony .... This conclusion recognizes that the 'shared enterprise' of
marriage may begin even before the actual marriage ceremony.', 249
Placing two conditions on this ruling, the court stated that the parties
must have adequately expressed the intention for the asset to be a shared
one and that they must have acquired the asset in specific contemplation
of their marriage. Similarly, in McGee v. McGee,251 a New Jersey trial
court included a family home owned by one party and purchased prior to
marriage in the marital estate.252 In so doing, the court explained that
"[t]he case can be viewed from the vantage point of the shared enterprise
of marriage beginning before the ceremonial act. 253
Finally, in Berrie v. Berrie,254 a New Jersey court expanded the rule
concerning pre-marital property to encompass assets other than the
marital home.255 In that case, the plaintiffs wife sought equitable
244. Id at 917.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 919.
247. 543 A.2d 1062 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
248. Id. at 1063.
249. Id. at 1065; see also In re Marriage of Altman, 530 P.2d 1012 (Colo. App. 1974);
Stallings v. Stallings, 393 N.E.2d 1065 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Bender v. Bender, 386 A.2d 772, 778-
79 (Md. 1978).
250. Weiss, 543 A.2d at 1065.
251. 648 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
252. Id. at 1134.
253. Id.
254. 600 A.2d 512 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
255. Id. at 518.
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distribution of the value of unregistered corporate stock held by her
husband, as measured from the date they began cohabiting rather than
the date of marriage.256 Relying on Weiss, the court concluded: "If the
parties by their combined efforts work as part of this 'partnership' to
increase the value of an asset held by one of them, such increase in
value.., might be subject to treatment as a partnership interest, which in
turn might be subject to equitable distribution., 257 The court added that
divorce rules were to be construed "to effectuate the public policy
underlying the equitable distribution law, which is to recognize that
marriage is 'a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, that in many
ways ... is akin to a partnership.' 258
Another example, this one from Washington, demonstrates a similar
judicial approach to pre-marital property and highlights how these
problems are already relevant to same-sex couples. In Walsh v.
Reynolds,259 Jean Walsh and her partner Kathryn Reynolds began living
together in 1988.260 The women lived together for twenty years, and
Walsh worked primarily as Reynold's housekeeper, a job for which
Reynolds paid her.261 Walsh also gave birth to two children who
Reynolds adopted.262 In 2010, the women separated and sought to
dissolve their domestic partnership, which had been registered in
California in 2000 and Washington in 2009.263 A main point of
contention was how to distribute the proceeds from the sale of the family
home. In 2003, the couple had purchased and moved into a home in
Federal Way. Both women "signed the deed, which expressly stated that
they were 'acquir[ing] all interest' in the property 'as joint tenants with
right of survivorship, and not as community property or as tenants in
common.' 264
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. (citing Smith v. Smith, 371 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1977) (quoting Rothman v. Rothman, 320
A.2d 496 (N.J. 1974))).
259. 183 Wash. App. 830, 335 P.3d 984 (2014), review denied, 182 Wash. 2d 1017, 345 P.3d
784 (2015).
260. Id. at 836, 335 P.3d at 986.
261. Id. at 836-37, 335 P.3d at 986-87.
262. Id. at 836, 335 P.3d at 987.
263. Id. at 836-37, 335 P.3d at 986-87. Washington is a community property state that
recognizes "equity" relationships, or common-law marriage. So at the time of the relationship
dissolution, the couple was considered by the court to be in an "equity" relationship.
264. Id. at 838, 335 P.3d at 987 (citation omitted). Because the mortgage was in Walsh's
name alone, the trial court concluded and the appellate court affirmed that they could not be joint
tenants. Instead, the court said, they were tenants in common.
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During the dissolution procedure, Walsh claimed that the proceeds
should have gone to her alone rather than being split evenly by the trial
court because she "made all financial contributions towards the
mortgage and reconstruction of the Federal Way house.., from her
separate property funds. 265 Reynolds had not contributed to either the
down payment or mortgage payments. In addition, Walsh had paid all
the utility bills. Walsh "concede[d] that Reynolds contributed to the
property in the form of 'sweat equity.' '266 The trial court took this"sweat equity" into consideration and awarded Reynolds close to half
the equity value of the home.267 The appellate court affirmed this award,
concluding that it was "just and equitable" considering Reynolds' "non-
financial contributions to the property., 268 The court, therefore, brought
the family home into the marital estate despite the fact that Reynolds
alone was financially responsible for the house and distributed its value
equitably on account of its shared use and Walsh's non-economic
contributions. This result is akin to what the result would likely have
been using New Jersey's pre-marital property concept. The result is,
furthermore, exemplary because it underscores the economic partnership
at work in the couple's relationship rather than the couple's marital
status.
2. Equitable Distribution Instead of Equitable Remedy
In Blumenthal v. Brewer, as in many other cohabitant cases, one party
requested the imposition of a constructive trust, a conventional equitable
remedy.269 In cases that turn on the question of property rights for hybrid
marriage partners, courts are confronted with one main choice. Courts
can choose to enlarge the marital estate by including the contested asset
and subsequently employ equitable distribution. Alternately, judges can
deploy the same equitable remedies that are also used to provision
cohabitants in cases of relationship termination. The court in McGee
265. Id. at 853, 335 P.3d at 995 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
266. Id. (citation omitted).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 855, 335 P.3d at 996 ("We hold that the trial court did not abuse its broad
discretion in the manner in which it crafted a just and equitable division of the parties' non-separate
properties, including its allocation of the equity in the Federal Way property, after balancing the
parties' respective needs and contributions."). The court also observed that "[t]he trial court also
based its decision, in part, on the fact that it did not award any maintenance to Reynolds, the party
with far less income and earning potential." Id.
269. See the discussion of Blumenthal v. Brewer, 24 N.E.3d 168 (Il1. App. Ct. 2014), supra
notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
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elaborated on this choice: "The case can be viewed from the vantage
point of the shared enterprise of marriage beginning before the
ceremonial act,... or as one in which equitable remedies such as
constructive trust, quasi contract or quantum meruit are invocable for
equitable reasons. 270
Some courts, however, have pointed out that certain equitable
remedies are inapposite. For example, in McKeown v. Frederick,271 a
New York case in which the husband sought to impose a constructive
trust on the shared home, the court declined to do so. 272 The court
reasoned that the imposition of a constructive trust was the incorrect
remedy because "constructive trusts are 'fraud-rectifying' remedies
rather than 'intent-enforcing remedies.' ' 273 Similarly, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court stated, in another case concerning two former spouses
disputing ownership of the shared home: "It is well settled that '[t]he
underlying principle of a constructive trust is the equitable prevention of
unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of another in situations in
which legal title to property was obtained by fraud or in violation of a
fiduciary or confidential relationship.' ' 274  Unless fraud exists,
constructive trust may not be the appropriate remedy. 275
Implied or quasi contract has met with more success in courts that are
reliant on leading cohabitant rights cases, Marvin v. Marvin276 in
particular, to provide precedent.277 Implied contract claims more closely
reflect the idea of a partnership agreement existing between the two
parties. The implied contract prevents the "provider from free riding"
and prevents unjust enrichment.278 This is particularly important when a
couple specializes household labor and one member of the couple not
270. McGee v. McGee, 648 A.2d 1128, 1134 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
271. No. 12/5055, 2013 WL 3068697 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18, 2013).
272. Id. at *17.
273. Id. at *4.
274. Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d 101, 111 (R.I. 2005) (citing Renaud v. Ewart, 712
A.2d 884, 885 (R.I. 1998)).
275. See Camivale v. Camivale, 885 N.Y.S.2d 871, 878 (Sup. Ct. 2009) ("Use of the cause of
action for constructive trust should not be distorted by courts as a device for enforcing an alleged
intent to confer a benefit, gain, gift, or a material expression of love ... [or] abused and misused as
a means of redressing disappointed expectations, frustrated intentions, and failed hopes.").
276. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
277. For discussion of the beneficial uses of implied contract, see Elizabeth Scott, Marriage,
Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 225 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 258 (2004)
("[C]ontract law can provide efficient default rules to clarify the implied understandings about
property and support obligations between parties in long-term intimate unions.").
278. ERTMAN, supra note 68, at 184.
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only develops her career but also benefits from the unpaid contributions
of the other. In Blumenthal v. Brewer, for example, a court might easily
find that the couple had an implied contract to divide labor roles and
compensate the homemaker accordingly. Nonetheless, a number of
states are resistant to deploying implied contract in the service of
cohabitant rights, and some states are beginning to legislate new rules
for cohabitant property and palimony claims. The New Jersey
legislature, for example, amended the state statute of frauds in 2010 to
read that no action can be brought by "one party to a non-marital
personal relationship to provide support or other consideration for the
other party, either during the course of such relationship or after its
termination" unless the agreement is in writing and both parties obtained
independent counsel.279 In a leading New York case on cohabitant
property rights, Morone v. Morone,280 the Court similarly ruled that any
claim to property rights for a cohabitant had to be based on an explicit
contract. 1 In the absence of an explicit contract or marriage status, the
Court stated, it was too difficult to determine what kind of bargain the
parties had made.282 The Court remarked that, as with common law
marriage, allowing cohabitant property claims "could work substantial
justice in certain cases, [but] there was no built-in method for
distinguishing between valid and specious claims., 283
The most significant problem, however, with the use of equitable
remedies to provision partners in hybrid marriages is that equitable
remedies entrench compensation in the realm of judicial discretion rather
than legal entitlement, transforming a right into a discretionary award. 284
Equitable remedies therefore replicate the problems inherent in using
distribution and maintenance instead of property division to compensate
spouses for their unpaid contributions. Courts choosing to look at assets
279. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5 (West, Westlaw through 2015). Subsequently, in New Jersey,
court decisions have clarified that "oral palimony agreements predating the 2010 Amendment to the
Statute of Frauds are not extinguished by the new law." Maeker v. Ross, 99 A.3d 795, 805 (N.J.
2014).
280. 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980).
281. Id. at 1158. Regarding the constructive trust, a court in 2013 mentioned that
"constructive trusts are 'fraud-rectifying' remedies rather than 'intent-enforcing remedies."'
McKeown v. Frederick, No. 12/5055, 2013 WL 3068697, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18, 2013)
(citations omitted).
282. Morone, 413 N.E.2d at 1157-58.
283. Id.
284. See Regan, supra note 47, at 2307 ("Typically, an individual deploys property rhetoric
when she wishes to frame a claim to resources as a request for the recognition of a right arising
either by virtue of her own efforts or as the result of a transaction involving an exchange for fair
value.").
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acquired outside of marriage as cohabitant property rather than pre-
marital property neither further the goals of economic partnership nor
reflect the true nature of marital bargains.
B. Measuring Duration and Modified Formalism
Although creating pre-marital property provides a solution for asset-
specific claims and contests, there are also property questions that turn
on the durational measure of the relationship, such as division of
income, pension, and other cumulative assets. Duration matters for the
calculation of certain benefits, such as social security, and for awards of
spousal maintenance.285 Likewise, duration matters because length of
marriage is a critical factor that courts use in the distribution phase of
property division.286 Courts therefore need to know not just how to
characterize a particular asset but also when to "flip the switch" and start
counting property for inclusion in the marital estate. This raises the
question of when an economic partnership begins. In this section, I
provide a framework for knowing when an economic partnership exists
through the identification of legal markers. I also discuss why this
formalist framework has advantages over a functionalist approach, for
reasons of both judicial efficiency and personal autonomy.
1. Timing Relationships Through Legal Markers
In a recent case from Connecticut, Mueller v. Tepler,287 the State
Supreme Court ruled that a same-sex partner could assert a spousal loss
of consortium claim against physicians even though she was not married
to the plaintiff at the time of the alleged negligent conduct. 288 The Court
concluded, however, that the partner would have to prove that "the
couple would have been married when the underlying tort occurred but
for the existence of a bar on such marriages under the laws of this
state., 289 The natural question that follows is how a same-sex couple
285. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West, Westlaw through 2015).
286. See, e.g., 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3502(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
287. 95 A.3d 1011 (Conn. 2014).
288. Id. at 1030.
289. Id. at 1026. The Court also created a requirement that "the marriage would not have been
inconsistent with public policy," which it said "places clear limits on liability for such claims." Id.
But see Charron v. Amaral, 889 N.E.2d 946, 951 (Mass. 2008) ("[H]owever sympathetic we may be
to the discriminatory effects the [invalidated] marriage licensing statute had ... to allow Kalish to
recover for a loss of consortium if she can prove she would have been married but for the ban on
same-sex marriage could open numbers of cases in all areas of law to the same argument.").
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proves that they would have been married absent legal impediment. As
Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller observe, "boundary disputes ... pose
a challenge to legal architects. 290 What actions and behaviors should a
court look to as signals? I propose that courts should look for instances
of clear legal intention to form an economic partnership. Courts need to
have bright-line markers because boundary "concerns may justify
heightened formalities for entry.",2 91 The legal moments can be asset-
specific, as in the case of a family home. In these cases, the court does
not have to determine a starting point but rather the intention tied to the
purchase of an asset. More difficult are determining which legal
moments communicate the beginning of a partnership period, a point at
which a court can start counting marital property.
In same-sex hybrid cases it is likely-at least for the duration of this
transitional period-that couples will have entered into domestic
partnerships or civil unions prior to being legally married. These are true
markers of legal intent to live as if married and to enter into an economic
partnership involving shared benefits, assets, and dependency. Domestic
partnerships and civil unions clearly mark moments outside of marriage
that demonstrate partnership formation.292 For this reason, the Social
Security Administration allows an applicant for spousal benefits to tack
on time spent as registered domestic partners to time of marriage.293
Accordingly, a court looking at the facts of Blumenthal v. Brewer for
property division purposes would, for example, have this option in
deciding when to begin measuring the marital estate. In that case, several
instances of legal intention existed because the couple was not only a
functional family; they "also took legal steps because of their lifelong
commitment., 294 They cross-adopted their three children, documented
their partnership in the Chicago "Domestic Partner Registry," and took
out a marriage license in Massachusetts.295 A court might, therefore,
begin counting assets in the marital estate as of the moment the couple
became registered domestic partners.
290. Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Freedom of Contracts 55 (Columbia Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 458, 2013), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2325254.
291. Id.
292. See Kelly, supra note 67, at 44 ("Other good evidence is if a couple registers as domestic
partners under a system of rules that recognizes marriage-like legal obligations between partners.").
293. See GNO0210.004 Non-Marital Relationships (Such as Civil Unions and Domestic
Partnerships), SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0200210004 (last visited
Aug. 18, 2015). This has helped many same-sex couples reach the nine-month minimum.
294. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 24 N.E.3d 168, 171 (Il1. App. Ct. 2014), appeal allowed, 31
N.E.3d 767 (Il1. 2015).
295. Id. at 171-72.
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In another example, Walsh v. Reynolds, several such indicators
existed and the Washington appellate court was called upon to review
the question of when the couple's "equity relationship" began for
property division purposes.2 96 In that case, the couple registered as
domestic partners in California in 2000 and in Washington in 2009.297
The trial court determined that the "equity relationship" began on
January 1, 2005, the date on which California amended its domestic
partnership statute to extend community property rights to registered
domestic partners.298 Walsh contended on appeal that the starting point
for measuring their marital property was 2009, when the couple
registered their domestic partnership in Washington.299 Reynolds, on the
other hand, claimed that the "equity relationship" began in 1988 at the
start of their relationship.3 °0
The appellate court stated: "There are several other dates [other than
that used by the trial court] that could serve as starting points for
application of this doctrine here," and discussed using the date on which
the couple registered as domestic partners in California in 2000.301 The
court also suggested that Washington's traditional common law test, a
five-factor test, was applicable in the situation at hand, particularly
because the trial court had remarked that the common law rule would
have governed "had Walsh and Reynolds been a legally recognized
heterosexual marriage. 30 2 Ultimately, the appellate court reversed the
trial court and remanded the case for new findings with respect to when
the "equity relationship" began and, subsequently, a revised order for
property distribution.0 3
Furthermore, because same-sex couples were unable to access marital
benefits prior to Windsor v. United States,30 4 and, subsequently,
Obergefell v. Hodges, °5 many have been encouraged to engage in estate
planning and to draft cohabitation agreements. LGBT organizations like
296. Walsh v. Reynolds, 183 Wash. App. 830, 830, 335 P.3d 984, 984 (2014), review denied,
182 Wash. 2d 1017, 345 P.3d 784 (2015).
297. Id. at 837-38, 335 P.3d at 987.
298. Id. at 840, 335 P.3d at 988-89.
299. Id. at 851, 335 P.3d at 994.
300. Id. at 841, 335 P.3d at 989.
301. Id. at 847, 335 P.3d at 992.
302. Id. at 847-48, 852-53, 335 P.3d at 992, 995 ("We see no reason why the five Long
'equity relationship' factors that the trial court applied to the parties' post-2005 relationship should
not also apply to their pre-2005 domestic partnership relationship in California.").
303. Id. at 859, 335 P.3d at 998.
304. 570 U.S.__ 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
305. 576 U.S.__ 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, °6 Lambda Legal,3 °7 and the
National Center for Lesbian Rights308 began, in the early days of the gay
rights and marriage equality movements, to offer robust information
about same-sex estate planning and legal strategies for obtaining
economic partnership rights outside of marriage. Martha Ertman,
claiming that family law should support "Plan B" contracts, observes
that "the long history of family exchanges argues for spouses holding
onto their contractual freedom. 30 9 These types of contracts are legal
indicators of both shared purpose and relationship commitment, and act
as a strong signal for courts to begin measuring and counting pre-marital
property. These contracts may take the shape of designated beneficiary
agreements, such as the ones that exist in Colorado, which allow
unmarried parties to give each other rights such as "the right to have
standing to sue for wrongful death" in the event of one party's death and
to name each other as beneficiaries in testamentary trusts for the
purposes of a nonprobate transfer on death, pension plans, and life
insurance.310 Other legal markers may include any form of registered
partnership that approximate what Erez Aloni calls for in the form of a"registered contractual relationship."31 These contracts all provide a
means for same-sex couples (and also different-sex couples) to signal
intent. Looking forward, these types of relationship contracts-like pre-
marital and marital contracts-also provide a means for both same- and
different-sex couples to shape the contours of their relationships by
opting out of default sharing rules and marking certain kinds of property
or income as separate.
306. See generally GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, LEGAL PLANNING FOR
SAME-SEX COUPLES: PREPARING FOR THE UNEXPECTED (2014), available at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/legal-planning-couples.pdf (providing estate-
planning advice and resources for same-sex couples).
307. See generally LAMBDA LEGAL, TAKE THE POWER: TOOLS FOR LIFE AND FINANCIAL
PLANNING (2014), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/
downloads/take the power-_2014_-_completepdf for website.pdf (providing an online guide
for same-sex estate planning).
308. See generally NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, YOUR LEGACY OF JUSTICE: PLANNED
GIVING QUESTIONS & ANSWERS FOR LGBT PEOPLE (2013), available at http://www.nclrights.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/07/NCLR-Estate-Planning- 1.04.13.pdf.
309. ERTMAN, supra note 68, at 175. Plan B contracts, as opposed to Plan A ones, are those
that contract for something other than the marital default rules. See also Scott, supra note 277, for a
discussion of the uses of contract law in family design.
310. See Colorado's Designated Beneficiary Agreement Act, COLO. BAR ASS'N,
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfin/ID/21614 (last visited Aug. 19, 2015); Designated Beneficiary
Agreement, DENVERGOV.ORG, https://www.denvergov.org/Portals/777/documents/MarriageCivil
Unions/Designated%20Beneficiary/ 20Agreement.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).
311. Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 574, 576, 607 (2013).
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Civil unions, registered domestic partnerships, designated beneficiary
relationships, and relationship contracts all enable couples to signal a
clear legal intent. These legal relationships allow couples to share a
variety of assets as well as benefits, such as health care, just as they
grant individuals certain rights, such as beneficiary rights and standing
rights to pursue certain claims.312 The intent is not an implicit one made
manifest through either time and work put into a relationship or shared
living. Instead, in these instances, couples make an affirmative decision
to define their relationship through a legal framework and, in all cases
except private contracting, the couple chooses to mediate their
relationship through the State. These are opt-in relationships that require
consideration and planning as well as personal agency. That these
relationship forms constitute dispositive examples of legal intention is
evident from the fact that many states have automatically converted
either civil unions or domestic partnerships into marriages.313
Some scholars and commentators suggest a functionalist approach
and the use of significant events in the life of a couple, such as the start
of cohabitation or the birth of shared children, to determine the
beginning date of the couple's relationship. This type of functional
analysis has roots in common law marriage. In common law marriage,
courts traditionally looked for indicators of economic entanglement,
such as the sharing of living expenses and the establishment of joint
bank accounts, including checking, savings, or investment accounts, as
well as cohabitation and shared parenting.314 In Washington, the five-
factor test for determining whether a couple is engaged in an "equity" or"meretricious" relationship underscores the role of functionality. The
factors include continuous cohabitation, relationship duration,
relationship purpose, pooling of resources, and parties' intent.315
Likewise, the American Law Institute, in its model rules for granting
312. See e.g., Colorado's Designated Beneficiary Agreement Act, supra note 310.
313. For example, once Connecticut began permitting same-sex marriage, the state converted
all civil unions into marriages. NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, MARRIAGE, DOMESTIC
PARTNERSHIPS, AND CIVIL UNIONS: SAME-SEX COUPLES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES (2015),
http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Relationship-Recognition.pdf. Likewise, in
Delaware, on July 1, 2014, all remaining civil unions were automatically converted to marriages by
operation of law. Id. For a survey of how states have treated this issue, see id This strategy of
converting civil unions into marriages is problematic from an autonomy standpoint, because in
many states it is automatic rather than opt-in.
314. GORAN LIND, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE: A LEGAL INSTITUTION FOR COHABITATION
536-42 (2008).
315. Walsh v. Reynolds, 183 Wash. App. 830, 846, 335 P.3d 984, 991 (2014), review denied,
182 Wash. 2d 1017, 345 P.3d 784 (2015).
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domestic partners' rights, looks to continuous cohabitation and length of
relationship, as well as economic entanglement.316
From this perspective, joint bank accounts or investments made
together certainly indicate shared economic purpose, as do instances of
more discretionary spending, such as joint charitable giving. 317 These
indicators do not, however, demonstrate the level of relationship
commitment necessary to switch on the counting of marital property.
These factors could signal that two people are anything from roommates
to investment partners. The problem is that, "[i]n comparison with
marriage, cohabitation relationships are not regulated by clearly defined
norms that prescribe behavioral expectations of financial support and
sharing. 3 18
Alternately, courts using a functional analysis have also looked to
cohabitation, shared parenting, and various types of non-legal wedding
and commitment ceremonies to indicate partnership.319 While these are
undoubtedly important events and do represent a type of lived intimacy,
they do not necessarily signal an intention to form either a legal or an
economic unit.32 0 The presence of children means that two individuals
share responsibility for the project of childrearing. Shared parenting is,
however, not necessarily an indicator or a continuing intimate
relationship, and it is something that even most divorced couples do.
Childbearing and rearing is, increasingly, a project that is disaggregated
from marriage or even intimate relationships. Continuous cohabitation
is also thought to indicate a shared life and strong form of intimacy.
However, cohabitation has many guises and couples who cohabitate do
so for a variety of reasons-for efficiency purposes, to try shared living
in contemplation of marriage, or out of economic necessity.3 22 This
316. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03 (Supp. 2002).
317. See Kelly, supra note 67, at 44 ("[T]he key assessment is how much the couple has
merged their financial resources.").
318. Scott, supra note 277, at 248.
319. See generally Allison Tait, Polygamy, Publicity and Locality: The Place of the Public in
Marriage Practice, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 173 (2011).
320. Moreover, the issue of economic partnership with respect to a child is mediated through
questions about child support, which are bracketed here.
321. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Census: More First-Time Mothers Give Birth out of Wedlock,
WASH. TIMES (July 8, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/S/census-more-first-
time-mothers-give-birth-out-wedl/?page=all; Meet the Co-Parents: Friends Not Lovers, THE
TELEGRAPH (July 31, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/mother-tongue/8659494/Meet-the-
co-parents-friends-not-lovers.html.
322. Cohabitation F.A.Q., UNMARRIED EQUALITY, http://www.unmarried.org/cohabitation/
faq/#cohabreasons (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
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variation in levels of commitment makes it difficult to say that
cohabitation signals a clear intent to be in a binding legal relationship.
In fact, courts that backdate property rights to the beginning of a
relationship or cohabitation may, in fact, be contravening the intention of
the partners, and creating economic injustice. In the Walsh case, if the
trial court determined that the "equity relationship" began when the two
women started living together, the court would have no way of knowing
what the couple's actual intention was at the time. 323 Using the moment
that they registered their domestic partnership in California, however,
allows the court to know with greater certainty what the parties intended.
Discussing this problem, Katherine Franke relates the example of a
lesbian couple who dated-with periods of conflict and separation-for
a number of years before getting married. During the divorce
proceedings, the court "'back-dated' their marriage to when [the couple]
started dating rather than to when they legally married., 324 Franke states
that the "easy and obvious choice" 325 would have been for the court to
use the date of marriage. Instead, the judge "wrote in her judgment that
prior to marriage, 'they had a nine year relationship when they
functioned as a couple. ,, 326 This backdating to a functional relationship
moment rather than a legal one resulted in the wealthier spouse being
liable for alimony and property division when the couple had made an
oral agreement to the contrary prior to their marriage. As Elizabeth Scott
has remarked: "The challenge is to design clear criteria that separate
marriage-like unions from those in which the parties are not married
because they do not want marital commitment or obligations. 327 What is
important, then, is that courts look to legal indicators outside of marriage
that signal the intention to form an economic partnership.
2. Enabling Judicial Efficiency and Personal Autonomy
There are drawbacks to using legal markers as opposed to more
323. One of the five factors in determining whether an equity relationship exists is "parties'
intent." Walsh v. Reynolds, 183 Wash. App. 830, 846, 336 P.3d 984, 991 (2014), review denied,
182 Wash. 2d 1017, 346 P.3d 784 (2015). However, at the dissolution of a relationship, parties may
easily disagree or remember differently what intent existed at what point in time.
324. KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY (forthcoming
2015).
325. Id.
326. Id
327. See Scott, supra note 277, at 258. Scott proposes the use of length of relationship as a
primary criterion. Id. at 259 ("[A] cohabitation period of substantial duration is the best available
proxy for commitment.").
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functional and informal ones. Using legal markers privileges those
individuals who have access to legal representation and can write
cohabitation agreements, wills, and other legal documents. These are
often the same individuals who have assets to protect, investments to
manage, and jobs that provide access to retirement savings as well as
health care and other benefits. In other words, the use of legal markers
increases the pre-existing systemic bias against economically
disadvantaged populations. These populations do not have access to
legal advice, to jobs with benefits like healthcare or life insurance, or
even sometimes to bank accounts. These groups are less likely to own
property, make wills, or engage in any estate planning. They are, overall,
less likely to have resources to protect or the understanding of what
benefits they might receive through legal planning. To bias the system of
property rules against these populations may seem both descriptively
unjust and normatively undesirable.
There are, nonetheless, substantial benefits to a modified formalist
approach both in terms of judicial efficiency and personal autonomy. 328
First, having a set of rules or factors for courts to use in determining
when an economic partnership merits judicial notice and treatment as a
marital or pre-marital relationship relieves courts from the burden of
extremely fact-intensive personal inquiries into intimate relationships.
One New York court stated the problem in this way:
[J]udicial inquiry into the timing and context of premarital''promises" or "statements of present intention" will involve
judges in matters of the heart that are intrusive on sensitive
subjective feelings-when did we love each other enough to be
considered in a fiduciary relationship--and lead to speculation
and solipsistic moral judgments, which the courts are incapable
of easily adjudicating and appellate courts will be challenged to
review. 329
Courts can rarely know what two individuals promised one another in
the absence of documentary evidence, not least because at the point of
divorce both parties usually recall quite differently what promises they
made and which were broken. Asking courts to adjudicate these kinds of
328. In describing a modified formalist approach, I take one of the definitions put forth by
Frederick Schauer, namely "the concept of decisionmaking according to rule." Frederick Schauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (emphasis in original); see also Rebecca Aviel, A New
Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2003, 2010 (defining formalism as "the
extent to which family law doctrines provide determinate instructions that can be more or less
mechanically applied to domestic relations disputes").
329. McKeown v. Frederick, No. 12/5055, 2013 WL 3068697, at *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18,
2013).
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questions without rules, or at the very least a set of guidelines, is
administratively burdensome and an endeavor prone to error. 330 Bright
line rules therefore aid courts in evaluating cases effectively and
consistently, and these "precise rules" that provide clear starting signals
in turn help individuals "predict the consequences of future
contingencies and to plan and structure their lives accordingly. 3 1 These
types of inquiries, moreover, recall the common law marriage
framework, which most courts and legislatures have rejected as against
public policy.332
Finally, relying on rules rather than functional analyses provides a
safeguard against conscription. There are couples who, according to a
functional analysis, are engaged in an economic partnership and would
therefore count as "married." However, to count some of these couples
as married when they were not may result in unfair property division.
Take Franke's example of a couple who cohabited and shared expenses
yet were not married. Despite their demonstrated intention to regulate
their own relationship arrangement before marriage, the court used a
functional analysis and conscripted them into marriage before they were
legally married. The outcome was to the detriment of their agreement
and intentions, and arguably unfair to the one who ended up paying
alimony and dividing a larger pot of marital property than she intended.
On the other hand, in Blumenthal v. Brewer, the court could have used
legal markers, such as the moment when the couple entered their names
into the Domestic Partnership Registry or obtained a marriage license-
to start counting marital property. In that instance, backdating would not
have contravened the intention of the parties, which was to organize
their lives, their household, and their assets as if they were married.
Both same- and different-sex couples may prefer to remain off the
marital grid for any number of personal reasons, and courts should
330. Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980) ("For courts to attempt through
hindsight to sort out the intentions of the parties and affix jural significance to conduct carried out
within an essentially private and generally noncontractual relationship runs too great a risk of
error.").
331. DAGAN, supra note 196, at 194; see also Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103
CALIF. L. REV. 747, 785 (2015) ("Formality also provides convenient evidence of marriage.
Formality cuts against the fraud concerns that plague elective marriage regimes, which must
examine myriad forms of evidence for indicia of intent to be married."); Kelly, supra note 67, at 43
("[D]efault rules in family law ... are more predictable, can more reliably protect vulnerable
persons, and are more easily applied by families without legal assistance.").
332. See Morone, 413 N.E.2d at 1155 (holding use of implied-contract theory was
"inconsistent with the legislative policy enunciated in 1933 when common-law marriages were
abolished in New York," and declining to follow Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976)).
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recognize and respect this choice.333 There are couples who have
philosophical objections to the institution itself. Women-in both same-
and different-sex relationships-may choose not to opt into a legal
relationship that is fraught with the vestiges of historical oppression.
Some couples may simply decide that they prefer a relationship
unmediated by the State. Couples may also have financial concerns. For
the majority of couples, there are financial incentives to marry.
However, this is not true for everyone. Certain couples face a tax penalty
upon marriage, and may choose therefore to remain unmarried. Other
couples choose not to marry because they might lose benefits or other
entitlements in doing so. Older couples in particular may choose to live
as if married without legally marrying in order to keep certain pension or
military benefits. Individuals also lose spousal support once they
remarry. Furthermore, certain individuals may choose not to marry to
protect themselves financially-to maintain a separation of debt between
themselves and their partner, to protect their credit rating, or to avoid
liability for medical expenses or other possible new debt. For the sake of
these couples, and in order to protect personal autonomy, courts should
safeguard the individual's right to stay unmarried and not be judicially
conscripted into an economic partnership. Rather, courts should use
legal markers to evaluate when pre-marital property exists and enlarge
marital estates.
CONCLUSION
After the battle for marriage equality comes the reality of divorce. As
an increasing number of same-sex couples avail themselves of new
marriage rights, same-sex couples will also be divorcing in increasing
numbers. This Article addresses the ways in which divorce and marital
property rules threaten to undermine the goals of marriage equality
without attention and reform. Issues arising in same-sex divorces
highlight the failing of current marital property rules to properly
compensate all spouses for their marital contributions and underscore
the ways in which courts have failed to take seriously the idea of
economic partnership, the cornerstone concept of equitable distribution.
The two maj or failings of the equitable distribution statutes relate to
when the calculation of the marital estate begins and what gets counted
as marital property. The timing concern made salient by same-sex
"hybrid" cases-in which the spouses have been long-term cohabiting
333. See Clarke, supra note 331, at 35 ("Formal marriage also gives couples the ability to stay
off the grid, opting out of legal marriage and the benefits and burdens it might entail.").
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partners but short-term marital partners-is the question of when an
economic partnership begins. Economic partnerships between romantic
partners do not magically begin at the moment of marriage. Instead, they
develop at various points of intimacy and commitment both in and
outside of marriage. A couple may develop an economic partnership
while on the path to marriage (just as couples often maintain economic
ties after marriage). Consequently, I propose that courts use the category
of "pre-marital" property, in hybrid cases, to count assets and income
acquired outside of but in contemplation of marriage. Courts should, in
these cases, start counting pre-marital property from the point at which
the couple made a sufficient showing that they possessed the intent to
form an economic partnership as well as a legal relationship.
With respect to what gets characterized as marital property, the
central problem is the resistance of courts to properly count spousal
contributions, whether to the education of the other spouse or to the
other spouse's business interests, when characterizing and distributing
property. By undervaluing these spousal contributions, courts are failing
to recognize the marital bargains in place and the economic partnerships
at work. Individual partners in a marriage should not be financially
penalized for the householding arrangements that put them into low-paid
or unpaid jobs for the benefit of the couple. The conventional approach
of compensating the low earner at divorce through distribution or
support is both inadequate and theoretically inapposite. If courts were
instead to count as property one spouse's contributions to the degree that
the spouse enhances the other's earning capacity and presume an equal
division, it would positively impact how spouses bargain with one
another, how diverse roles get valued in the marital bargain, and how
gender is both prescribed and performed within marriage.
These proposals for change, inspired by the advent of same-sex
divorce and the need for divorce equality, provide a blueprint for courts
as they encounter an increasing number of same-sex divorces. At the
same time, these proposals will benefit all couples, in that modified
equitable distribution norms will better reflect the infinite variety of
marital bargains that couples make. Reforming equitable distribution in
order to better reflect the ideal of marriage as an economic partnership
will help reshape the gendered contours of marriage by recalibrating the
values attached to various forms of labor. Ultimately, equitable
compensation for spousal contributions will help advance the aims of
marriage equality by bringing about divorce equality.
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